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SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & KISHOR UPRETY

Hydro-Politics in South Asia:
A Comparative Analysis of the
Mahakali and the Ganges Treaties
ABSTRACT
The numerous problems raised by the management of water
resources are currently receiving ever-greater attention from
governments around the globe. These problems stem from the fact
that water resourcesare qualitativelyand quantitatively limited,
and that opportunities for the exploitation of these resources
abound. These factors have led to an increasingneed to adopt an
integratedapproachto the development of water resources. In this
context, the triangularrelations between Bangladesh,India, and
Nepal in South Asia posit an intriguingand unique set of circumstances that illustrates the effect that the practices of one country
can have on other surroundingcountries. India has significantly
shaped theforeign economic relationsbetween India andBangladesh
and India and Nepal, especially insofaras water resources development and cooperation are concerned. Indeed, the geographic
proximity of Bangladesh and Nepal to India has compelled these
countries to cooperatewith India in each country's utilization of
water resources.In order to formalize this cooperation,two treaties
of significant importancewere entered into in 1996 between India
and Nepal and India and Bangladesh.These treatiesare known as
the Mahakali River Treaty between India and Nepal and the
Ganges River Treaty between India and Bangladesh. This article
provides a comparativeanalysis of the two treaties andfocuses on
the problematique related to their finalization. The article also
discusses the interestingpolitical twists of events and highlights
the criticalaspects of the implementation of the treaties,andfurther
analyzes the opportunitiesprovided by the treatiesfor cooperation
between India, Bangladesh, and Nepal in the area of water resources management.
I.

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

1996 was an important year for those interested in the study of the
development of water resources cooperation within the South Asian sub-

* Members of the Legal Department of the World Bank. The views expressed in this
article are those of the authors and should not be read as representing the views of the
World Bank. The authors thank Dr. M. Nawaz, former director of the IFAD Legal
Department, for his comments on an earlier version of this article,
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continent, and particularly for those interested in bilateral regimes
established by international treaties relating to international rivers.' In
February 1996, India and Nepal entered into the Mahakali River Treaty
(Mahakali Treaty). This treaty is important because it sets forth the
foundation for an integrated development approach to water use between
India and Nepal on the Mahakali River.2 Subsequently, in December 1996
the Ganges River Treaty (Ganges Treaty) was entered into between India
and Bangladesh. This treaty is equally important because it attempts to
resolve the highly sensitive political problems encountered between India
and Bangladesh in their efforts to share the waters of the Ganges River?
On the surface, these two treaties appear to be independent of each
other. It is important to understand, however, that the Mahakali River itself
is a tributary of the Ganges River. Also noteworthy is the fact that India is
a lower riparian user of the Mahakali River vis-a-vis Nepal and an upper
riparian user of the Ganges River vis-a-vis Bangladesh. Both of these
treaties therefore potentially may have an impact on the other based on the
fact that water use between these three countries is intertwined. Not only
do both treaties attempt to resolve long-standing water disputes between
Nepal and India and Bangladesh and India, the treaties also create new
standards that may affect sub-regional water resource cooperation
agreements among these three countries in the future.
The primary purpose of this article is to examine the provisions of
the Mahakali Treaty as compared with the provisions of the Ganges Treaty.

1. An international river is one either flowing through the territory of more than one

country (also referred to as a successive river), or one separating the territory of two countries
from one another (also referred to as a boundary river or a contiguous river). See THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL DRANAGE BASiNs 16 (A.H. Garrestson et al. eds., 1967). The use of the terms
"international river" and "international waterway" has gradually, over the years, given way
to the more appropriate and inclusive term "international watercourse." The United Nations
Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses defines
watercourse as "a system of surface waters and groundwater constituting by virtue of their
physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus." The
Convention defines international watercourse as "a watercourse parts of which are situated
in different states." See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, May 21,1997, art. 2(a), (b), 36 I.L.M. 700,705.
2. See Treaty Concerning the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River, Feb. 12,
1996, India-Nepal, 36 LLM. 531 [hereinafter Mahakali Treaty).
3. See Treaty on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka, Dec. 12,1996, BangladeshIndia, 36 I.LM. 519 [hereinafter Ganges Treaty].
4. In addition to being an international river with upper and lower riparian users, the
Mahakali River, according to the preamble to the Mahakali Treaty, is also "a boundary river
on major stretches between the two countries." See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, Preamble,
36 I.L.M. at 533. The words "on major stretches" imply that the Mahakali River is not
exclusively a boundary river. The drafters of the treaty were striving to illustrate that, in some
locations, the river is entirely within one single country.
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In order to facilitate this discussion, the article will first briefly describe the
political climate that existed between India and Nepal and between India
and Bangladesh prior to the respective conclusion of each treaty. This
discussion will provide a valuable understanding of the evolutionary
features of the cooperative forces involved in developing the Mahakali
Treaty and the Ganges Treaty. With this background in mind, in light of the
importance and potential impact of the two treaties on the Indo-NepalBangladesh region, this article will analyze and compare the ways similar
issues are dealt with by the two treaties. The article argues that in this
connection, although the conclusion of the Mahakali and Ganges treaties
is a major achievement for all three countries concerned, the actual success
of each of the treaties is contingent on extrinsic factors. For example,
success of the Mahakali Treaty is largely dependent on the generation of a
detailed project report that will lead to the effective carrying out of works
pertaining to the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project on the Mahakali
River. Likewise, success in the Ganges Treaty will only be realized if there
is enough water in the Ganges River to meet the agreed upon watersharing amounts between India and Bangladesh. Finally, the article will
discuss possibilities for future water resources cooperation between Nepal,
India, and Bangladesh.
II. THE SETTING
A.

The Mahakali River

Three separate river systems, each having its headwaters in the
Tibetan plateau, flow through Nepal. The Sapta-Kosi River system flows
from the eastern mountains, the Gandaki River system flows from the
central mountains, and the Karnali River system flows from the far western
mountains. In addition to these three principal river systems, there is
another river system in the far western area of Nepal known as the
Mahakali River System. The Mahakali River begins where two rivers, the
Kali River beginning in the Taklakot area in the east, and the Kuthi-Yankti
River originating in the Zanskar range of the Himalayas, meet at Kawa
Malla in the Darchula District in Nepal. The merging of the Kali and KuthiYankti Rivers is known as the Mahakali River. The Mahakali River flows
southwest, where it makes numerous oxbow lakes and is joined by many
tributaries, the largest among which are the Chamlia River and the
Chavandigad River.'

5. See N.B. & D.D. THAPA, GEOGRAPHY OF NEPAL PHYsiCAL, ECONOMIc, CULTURAL AND

REGIONAL 23-24 (1969).
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The Mahakali River drains an area of 188 sq. km in Nepal. The
average discharge of water recorded from the river is 7,288 cubic meters
per second, while the maximum discharge amount is 121 cubic meters per
second. The maximum annual discharge from the river is 1,066 cubic
meters per second.'
The Mahakali River serves as a western boundary for long
distances between Nepal and India along the border of the Indian State of
Uttar Pradesh. It is called the Sarada River in India, and after it is joined by
the Ghaghra River in the State of Uttar Pradesh, it is called the Ghaghra
River. The Ghaghra River continues to flow eastward, and joins the Ganges
River immediately after crossing the State of Uttar Pradesh in the State of
Bihar.'
B. The Ganges River
The Ganges River, known in India as the Ganga River, and in
Bangladesh as the Padma River, is an international river, to which India,
Bangladesh, Nepal and, to a small extent, China are riparians. The Ganges
River is the largest river in India. It originates in the state of Uttar Pradesh
and is joined by a number of tributaries originating inside India, such as
the Yamuna River, the Tons River, and the Gomti River. As mentioned
above, other tributaries originating in Nepal also join the Ganga River,
including the Ghaghra River (also known as the Sarada River or Mahakali
River), as well as others that originate near the Nepal-China border in
Tibet, such as the Kosi River and the Gandak River.!
The delta of the Ganges River starts at Farakka, in the Indian State
of West Bengal. Downstream from Farakka the river splits into the Padma
River, which flows eastward into Bangladesh, and the Bhagirathi River,
which continues to flow southward into West Bengal. After the Jalangi
River joins the Bhagirathi River, it is known as the Hooghly River. Calcutta
City, the capital of West Bengal and one of India's most important ports, is
situated on the Hooghly River. South of Calcutta, the Hooghly River is
joined by the Damodar River, which flows into the Bay of Bengal.9
In Bangladesh, the Ganges River, also known as the Padma River,
is joined by the Brahmaputra River (known in Bangladesh as the Jamuna

6.

See CHANDRA K. SHARMA, GEOLOGY OF NEPAL 16 (1973).

7. See A. Ramachandra Rao &T. Prasad, Water Resources Developmentof thelndo-Nepal
Region, 10 WATER RESOURCES DEV. 157,160-61 (1994).
8. See BR. CHAUHAN, SrrLBNT OFDENATIONALANDINTEn-STATEWATERDISPUFES
IN INDIA 107. See also Rao & Prasad, supranote 7, at 160-161.
9. For a detailed description of the Ganges basin, see CHAUHAN, supranote 8, at 98.
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River) and also by the Meghna River." The combination of these three
rivers, which continues to be called the Padma River, splits downstream
into a number of channels that flow into the Bay of BengaL The total length
of the Ganges is about 1,600 miles (about 2,500 kilometers)." The Ganges
River Basin is one of the most densely populated basins in the world. The
total population of this basin is more than 300 million, of whom about 10
million reside in Nepal, about 40 million live in Bangladesh, and the rest,
about 250 million, are located in India. This heavy population density has,
among other things, caused the Ganges River to be one of the most
polluted rivers in the world." Interestingly indeed, in spite of the tremendous importance of the Ganges River on the livelihood of most riparian
countries, the four riparian states of the Ganges River (India, Nepal,
Bangladesh, and China) have never entered into a water-management
treaty for the Ganges River, nor has any joint river basin management
forum for these riparian states been organized. This is perhaps due to the
political and ideological differences, as well as the varying, and possibly
conflicting interests amongst the riparian countries.
III. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Although political relations between India and Nepal have, in
general, been smooth over the centuries, the relations between these two
countries regarding the development of water projects on shared rivers
have not. In fact, these two countries have had a long-standing dispute
concerning water sharing in the major rivers originating in Nepal and
flowing into India.' A significant factor fueling this dispute is that the
provisions contained in the existing treaties lack specificity. This has left

10. Both the Brahmaputra River and the Meghna River are international rivers. The

riparian states for the Brahmaputra are China, Bhutan, India, and Bangladesh. The Meghna
River is shared only by India and Bangladesh. See CHAUHAN, supra note 8, at 98,103; BEN
CROW E AL., SHAmG THE GANGES- THE PoLrKS AND TechNOLOGY oF RIvER DEv,OPmENr

185-86 (1995).
11. See CHAUHAN, supra note 8, at 99.
12. "[One hundred and fourteen) cities pour untreated sewage into India's most

important river, the Ganges. Its Yamuna tributary picks up a daily 200 million litres of sewage
and 20 million litres of industrial waste in Delhi alone." Peter Wallensteen & Ashok Swain,
InternationalFresh WaterResources: Conflictor Cooperation,in COMPREHENSlESE5M
THE FRESHWATER RESOuRCES OF THE WORLD 6 (1997).

OF

13. Generally speaking, the waters from more than 6,000 rivers and rivulets in Nepal
ultimately flow toward the Ganges. However, more specifically, the Indo-Nepal river system
can be classified into seven river systems that range from east to west. Mahananda, Kosi,
Kamla Balan, Bagmati, Burhi Gandaki, Gandak, and Ghaghra. All these rivers as well as their
major tributaries originate in Nepal and, after traversing various distances in Nepal, enter
Indian territory and join the Ganges. See Rao & Prasad, supra note 7, at 160-61.
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room for ambiguity and controversy in the interpretation and enforcement
of the provisions of these water-sharing agreements. In addition, the
subject matter of the treaties varies depending on what the pressing issue
was at the time the treaty was negotiated. For example, these treaties deal
with such topics as catchment area ratios, land area development ratios,
investment ratios, riparian rights, and the value of water in varying
degrees. Recall that the Mahakali River is an international river that flows
from Nepal into India, and that it also serves as a boundary for large
distances between these two countries. With respect to the Mahakali River,
therefore, these problems are further complicated and intensified because
the river also serves as an international border between the two countries
in major stretches.
The history of negotiations regarding water projects for this river
has been dominated by controversies due primarily to a lack of trust
between the citizens and governments of the two countries. Most Nepalese
are convinced that they have not been equitably treated by the treaties.14
These Nepalese believe further that India is draining Nepal's watershed for
its own benefit.'5 As support for this conviction, many Nepalese maintain
that the kindness and generosity of Nepal in sharing its water with India
in previous agreements (e.g., the Sarada Treaty of 1920, the Kosi Treaty of
1954, and the Gandak Treaty of 1959) have been taken advantage of by
India because the people of Nepal have received far less benefits than the
people of India from the projects constructed under these treaties."
The Indian stance has been that of defending, as a lower riparian
country, its equitable use of these international rivers according to
international law and practice. India contends that it has the right to use the
water in accordance with its need for the water. India has, however,
interpreted the term "need" to describe its socio-economic requirements for
the waters of the Mahakali as unconstrained. As a result, India believes it
should have access to the waters of the Mahakali unfettered by the need for
this water by Nepal.
The Indo-Nepal efforts to cooperate in the management of water
resources have, thus, always revolved around this dichotomy of perception
and have always involved continual controversy. This tense relationship,
however, has led to a slow development of water resources projects that
may prove to be beneficial to both India and Nepal.

14. See Rao & Prasad, supranote 7, at 166.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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A. The Sarada Treaty
The efforts toward exploitation of Himalayan river waters began
before India's independence from Britain.17 The British Government in
India formalized the negotiations of the Sarada Treaty by exchanging
letters with its Nepalese counterpart in 1920.' The agreement provided for
the construction of a barrage (a dam) on the Mahakali River (which is
known as the Sarada River in India) at Banbassa, bordering the present
Mahendra Nagar in Nepal. The treaty also provided for the construction
of a power station at Khatima in connection with the Sarada Canal Project'
in the state of Uttar Pradesh in India. Under the Sarada Treaty, the
government of Nepal agreed to exchange 4,000 acres of its territory for
construction purposes with an equal amount of land from the British
Indian Government.' As a result, The British Indian Government built the
Banbassa Barrage across the Sarada River. In this agreement, Nepal also
obtained the right to use a minimum of 400 cubic-feet per second (cusecs)
and a maximum of 1,000 cubic-feet per second (cusecs) of water from the
Sarada Canal for irrigation purposes. 21 This land exchange placed the
location of the left abutment of the weir and the left bank works within
Indian territory. The headwork (the containing bank) of the Sarada Canal
is situated a few miles below the point where the river emerges from the
hills and forms part of the boundary between India and Nepal.
In spite of the conclusion of the Sarada Treaty, Nepal was not
entirely satisfied with the quantum of water it had been able to obtain
under the Treaty (400 cusecs) and tried continuously to obtain an increase
over the guaranteed flow of 400 cusecs. All efforts to obtain this increase
failed and the resulting shortage of water thus hindered Nepal from
developing an upstream projecL Amidst this tug of war between the two
countries over the quantum of water, the regime established by the Sarada
Treaty continued to exist for seventy-six years, from 1920 to 1996, until the
Mahakali Treaty replaced it in 1996.

17. See B.C. UPR rn, POLItcs Op HIMALAYAN RrvERs WATERs 94 (1993).

18. Letter from Maharaja Chandra, Nepal, to Colonel Kennion (Aug. 23,1920); Letter
from The British Legation, Nepal, to Maharaja Chandra, Nepal (Oct. 21, 1920) [hereinafter
Sarada Treaty] (on file with the Nepal National Archives and with authors).
19. See id. The Sarada Canal Project for the irrigation of about a million acres in Uttar
Pradesh was started in 1915 and completed in 1926.
20. See id. 12.

21. Seeid. 11.
22. The project is called the Mahakali Irrigation Project, a mega project which was later
also called the Pancheshwar Project. The Project was expected to generate 2,000 MW and
provide irrigation benefits. See text infra § IV(A)(3).
23. See text infra § IV.
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B. The Tanakpur Agreement
In the spirit of furthering cooperation within the Mahakali River
area, the governments of India and Nepal entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), commonly referred to as the Tanakpur Agreement,
on December 6,1991.24 The agreement provided for the construction of the
left afflux bund (the retaining wall) on Nepalese territory for which the
Nepalese provided 2.9 hectares of land. Unlike the Sarada Treaty, however,
the Tanakpur Agreement did not provide for an even exchange of land
from India. The agreement, instead, provided for the installation of a head
regulator (the main part of the reservoir that regulates the water flow) at
the Tanakpur Barrage with a capacity of 1,000 cusecs, and required India
to construct a canal so that 150 cusecs of water could be delivered to Nepal.
India was further required to provide Nepal with 10 megawatts of
electricity. Furthermore, the Tanakpur Agreement stated that when there
was an increase in the water supply at the Pancheshwar Reservoir, the
supply of water to Nepal would also be increased. The provision of water
and electricity by India to Nepal was seen as the quid pro quo to Nepal for
providing India with 2.9 hectares of its land, which was needed to
construct the afflux bund.
In hindsight, however, entering into the Tanakpur Agreement with
India in December 1991 now seems like a hasty decision. The Nepalese
government, led by Mr. Girija Koirala, the Prime Minister at that time,
either did not appreciate the legal, socio-economic, and political ramifications involved in the issue, or decided to overlook them to appease India.'
The deal, which relinquished 2.9 hectares of Nepalese land to India to build
a dam and a 120-megawatt power station in return for a share of the water
and power, was immediately criticized by most of Nepal's opposing
political parties.r'
The issues raised in the objection of the deal primarily dealt with
a concern for Nepalese territorial sovereignty and a belief that Nepal had
not benefited equally with India from the project. Those opposing the
agreement argued that since the agreement dealt with natural resources it
fell under the articles of the Constitution and required ratification by a two-

24. Memorandum of Understanding on Tanakpur Barrage Project, Dec. 6,1991, signed
by Maheshwar Prasad Singh, Nepalese Minister of Law and Justice, and Madhav Singh

Solonid, Indian Foreign Minister [hereinafter MOU or Tanakpur Agreement]. The MOU was
published in Nepali in the NEPAL GAZETTE, Jan. 1992, (copy on file with authors).
25. See Abu Taher Salahuddin Ahmed, Challengesof Go-nance in Nepal: Politico-Economic
and Ethno-Religious Dimensions,24 J.CoNT&AP. ASIA 351,360-64 (1994).
26. See id. at 360.
27. See id.
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thirds majority of Parliament.' A writ petition was filed in the Supreme
Court, with the Prime Minister as one of the respondents, challenging the
validity of the Tanakpur Agreement" The petitioners maintained that the
agreement should have been presented to Parliament for ratification prior
to its enforcement in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.e
The Prime Minister argued that the decision to give 2.9 hectares of
land to India was merely part of a memorandum of understandingsigned by
the Nepalese Minister of Law and Justice and the Indian Foreign Minister,
and therefore was not a "treaty" that was subject to the Constitutional
provisions requiring ratification. 31 This argument, however, was rejected
by most of the Nepalese, who saw the Tanakpur Agreement as another
concession to India regarding water resource issues.32 Gradually the
circumstances surrounding the Tanakpur Agreement became more
complex and controversial. The Supreme Court issued its verdict in
December 1992 and concluded that the Tanakpur Agreement was, indeed,
a treaty that required ratification by the Parliament, and was not a mere
memorandum of understanding.'
It is worth noting that on water resource issues, the political parties
in Nepal hold sharply contrasting views. This controversy has had a
snowball effect on the political climate in Nepal and continues to polarize
the political parties on the issue of nationalism. The Tanakpur controversy
has not receded and is not likely to given the entrenched division among
the various political forces in Nepal and India's "no-negotiation" posture
on the matter. Reportedly, the Indian External Affairs Minister Dinesh
Singh's cryptic statement that "Everything hinges on Tanakpur" loomed
larger than was generally recognized.'

28. According to the Constitution of Nepal, ratification of, accession to, acceptance of,
or approval of treaties or agreements regarding natural resources and the distribution of their
uses are to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members present at a joint sitting of
both houses of the Parliament. See NEPAL CONST. art. 126(2)(d) (1990) [hereinafter the
Constitution).
29. Re B.K. Neupane v. Prime Minister of Nepal, Writ No. 1851 (Nepal Supreme Court
1992).
30. The Petition invoked Article 126 (2) (d) of the Constitution (petition published in the
Nepal Supreme Court Bulletin in Nepali).
31. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, I.L.M. 689, defines
treaty in Article 2.1(a) as "an international agreement concluded between States in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two
or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." As such the Tanakpur
Agreement would qualify as a treaty under international law.
32. See Ahmed, supra note 25, at 361.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 362.
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When the then Prime Minister of India, Narasimha Rao, visited
Nepal in October 1992, he also made it clear that India would not change
its stance on the Tanakpur issue. The water resources issues, and particularly the Tanakpur issue, became the most formidable challenge that has
since rocked the succeeding governments in Nepal.3 The Tanakpur
Agreement has never formally been ratified because the government has
not presented it to Parliament.' Ironically, however, by the time the
Supreme Court verdict was rendered, the physical work at the Tanakpur
area, particularly on the Nepalese side, was almost completed. Further
discussion on the issue had become moot, therefore.
C. The Farakka Barrage
The history of water sharing between India and Bangladesh, like
the history between India and Nepal, is long-standing, has become very
complex, and has often been turbulent, particularly over the Ganges River.
The dispute over the sharing of the waters of the Ganges River erupted in
1951 because India decided to construct the Farakka Barrage in West
Bengal, about ten miles from India's border with Bangladesh-' India
contended that construction of the Farakka Barrage was needed in order
to divert waters from the Ganges River to the Hooghly River for a variety
of reasons. First, India stated that water from the Ganges River was needed
to maintain the flow in the Hooghly River so that the river would remain
navigable. India also maintained that more water was needed in the
Hooghly River in order to flush out the silt that deposited in the Calcutta
Port to ensure that the port would remain accessible. India stated further
that additional water was needed in the Hooghly River to counteract a high
concentration of salinity in the water and to provide Calcutta with water
&'
for irrigation, domestic, and municipal purposes.

35. See id.
36. See Krishna B.11hattachan, Nepal in 1993: Business as Usual, 34 ASIAN SURVEY, Feb.
1994, at 177.

37. See Tauhidul Anwar Khan, Management and Sharingof the Ganges,36 NAT. RESOURCES

J.455,460-61 (1996).

38. See CROW rT AL, supra note 10, at 26-27; UPRi, supra note 17, at 131-32. See generally
S.C. Mazudar, Ganga Barrage and the Bhagirathi-Hooghly River Problems, in FARAKKA-A
GORoIAN KNOT, PaoBi~Ms ON SHARING THE GANGA WATER 75 (Sunil Sen Sarma ed., 1986);
K.K. Framji, A Project to Save Calcutta Port, in FARAKKA-A GORDIAN KNOT, PROBLEM ON
SHARING THE GANGA WATER, supra, at 100; K.P. Mathrani, The Case of the EasternRivers, in
FARAKKA-A GORDIAN KNOT, PROBLmS ON SHARING THE GANGA WATER, supra,at 109.
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Although the decision to construct the Farakka Barrage was made
in 1951, actual work on the barrage did not begin until 1961" and was not
completed until 1971. The barrage, which is about 2,240 meters long, began
operating on April 21, 1975. The barrage was built to guarantee that the
Hooghly River would receive, however low the flow of the Ganges might
be, up to 40,000 cubic-feet per second (cusecs) of water from the Ganges
River. This decision was premised on the assumption that the availability
of water in the Ganges River at Farakka in the worst lean season would be
around 50,000 to 55,000 cusecs, and that the remaining 10,000 to 15,000
cusecs would then be available to be released to Bangladesh. '
In opposing the barrage, Bangladesh insisted that the lean flow of
the Ganges River of 50,000 to 55,000 cusecs constituted the normal and
basic requirements of the area for irrigation, domestic, municipal, and other
uses. Bangladesh further contended that any decrease in the flow of the
Ganges River would negatively affect irrigation, decrease the water supply,
inhibit fishery production, reduce groundwater tables, aggravate the
salinity problem, and restrict river navigation, which is the most frequently
used mode of transportation in Bangladesh."1
During the 1950s and the 1960s, Pakistan (of which Bangladesh
was then a part) strongly opposed the construction of the barrage, and tried
different diplomatic channels to stop its construction. 42 In 1971, the People's
Republic of Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation. Despite the

39. In March 1956, India denounced the "Convention and Statute on the Regime of
Navigable Waterways of International Concern," known as the Barcelona Convention.
Pakistan contended that India's action was meant to pave the way for the construction of the
Farakka Barrage. India, however, contended that the Barcelona Convention dealt only with
inland navigation. For discussions on the issue, see CROW Er AL., supra note 10, at 65-66; B.M.
ABBAS A.T., THE GANGES WATER DISPUE 19-20 (2d ed. 1982).
40. See UPRET, supranote 17, at 132; ABBAS, supra note 39, at 13.
41. For a detailed history of the Farakka Barrage and the dispute, and for the arguments
of each country, see CROW SlTAL-, supna note 10; ABBAS, supranote 39; B.G. VERCHESE, WATERS
OF HOPE, INTEGRATED WATER REOCE DvEmOPMENT AND REGIONAL COOPERATION WITHIN
THE HWMALAYAN-GANGA-BRAMAIRA-BARAK BASIN (1990). See generally, FARAIKA-A
GORDIAN KNOT, supranote 38.

42. It should be noted that at the time India and Pakistan were deadlocked over the
Ganges River, negotiations that were mediated by the World Bank over the Indus River were
proceeding well. The Indus Waters Treaty was signed on Sept 19,1960, by Messrs. Jawaharlal
Nehru and Mohamed Ayub Khan. The World Bank was also a signatory to the Indus Waters
Treaty, but only for the purposes specified in Article V (Financial Provisions-Indus Basin
Development Fund administered by the Bank) and Article X (Emergency Provisions), and
Annexures F, G and H of the treaty. Indus Water Treaty, Sept. 19,1960, India-Pakistan, art.
V, X, Annexures F, G, H. See Khan, supra note 37, at 461.
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initial close ties between Bangladesh and India,' the Farakka Barrage
controversy remained a thorny issue, and Bangladesh opposed it vehemently. Bangladesh raised the issue of the Farakka Barrage and lodged
complaints about the negative ways in which the barrage would affect
Bangladesh at a number of regional and international summits, including
the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1976."
Since the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation, the issue of
the Farakka Barrage has been one of the most dominant and important
elements in the Indo-Bangladesh relationship.t
D. The Early Agreements on the Ganges River
During June to December, the flow of the Ganges River is usually
very high due to rainfall generated by monsoons. Since there is plenty of
water during the monsoon season, the need for agreements between India
and Bangladesh to share the waters of the Ganges River from June to
December is not an issue. During the months of January to May, however,
the water in the Ganges River is generally very low, and thus water sharing
arrangements between Bangladesh and India are imperative during this
time. The water sharing arrangements discussed in this section were only
intended to be temporary while a long-term solution for augmentation of
the flow of the Ganges River during the low season was being sought.
Despite India's determination to build and use the Farakka Barrage
on the one hand, and the opposition of Bangladesh to the construction and
use of the barrage by India on the other hand, a number of agreements
were reached between India and Bangladesh prior to the 1996 Ganges
Treaty. These agreements primarily dealt with how water from the Ganges
could be shared between the two countries during the dry season. The first
of these agreements was finalized on April 18,1975, only three days prior
to the commissioning of the Farakka Barrage on April 21, 1975, and

43. On March 19,1972, India and Bangladesh signed the Indo-Bangladesh Friendship
Treaty, which remained in force for 25 years until it lapsed on March 19,1997. See ABBAS,
supra note 39, at 32.
44. Viewed from international law principles on international waterways, India's
position initially seemed to lean toward the principle of "absolute territorial sovereignty,"
according to which a riparian state has an unrestricted right to regulate and use within its
territory the waters of an international basin. On the other hand, Bangladesh's position
seemed to rely on the principle of "territorial integrity" where the lower riparian has the right
to demand the natural and uninterrupted flow of the basin. For a full discussion of the
different theories on the topic, see Jerome Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 1. For details on the UN discussions on the
issue, see CROW uT AL, supra note 10, at 110-13.
45.

See generallyABBAS, supranote 39.
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remained in effect until May 31, 1975.' In this agreement, India and
Bangladesh allocated the waters of the Ganges River during the remaining
forty-one days of the dry season of 1975. In effect, this agreement symbolized the acceptance by Bangladesh of India's decision to build the Farakka
Barrage as afait accompli. 7
As a result of the 1975 agreement, the controversy shifted from
arguing over whether the barrage should be built to determining the
quantity of water to be shared from the Ganges River by India and
Bangladesh during the dry season. Under this agreement, India's share of
water during each of the four ten-day periods was far less than the 40,000
cusecs it had initially demanded, and represented between 20 percent to 25
percent of the available water in the Ganges River. In contrast, the share of
water that Bangladesh was entitled to under the agreement ranged
between 75 percent to 80 percent of the available water in the Ganges
River." The actual amount of water that Bangladesh received during those
41 days represented about 77 percent of the total amount of water in the
Ganges River for that period, while the actual amount of water that India
received for the same period was about 23 percent.'9
The Agreement expired on May 31,1975, and was not renewed.
Furthermore, no attempt was made by India to enter into another
agreement, as Bangladesh had expected. Unfortunately, the first agreement
was therefore followed by a vacuum that lasted for about two years. As a
consequence, the sharing of the lean flow of the Ganges River between
India and Bangladesh during the dry seasons of 1976 and 1977 was not
regulated by any agreement between the two countries.s

46. The agreement was announced "in the form of a joint press release." ABBAS, supra
note 39, at 41. For an etract of the main part of the agreement, including the table below, see
ABBAS, supra note 39, at 41. According to this agreement, the amounts of water to be
withdrawn by India were as follows:
Withdrawal
Ten-day Period
Month
11,000 cusecs
21st to 30th
April, 1975
12,000 cusecs
Ist to 10th
May, 1975
15,000 cusecs
l1th to 20th
16,000 cusecs
21st to 31st
The remaining flow would then go to Bangladesh. See also UPRErI, supra note 17, at 134.
47. Following the announcement of the 1975 Agreement an official Bangladesh
delegation actually attended the commissioning of the Farakka Barrage on April 21,1975. See
ABBAS, supra note 39, at 42.
48. Available water for this period according to the 1977 Agreement ranges between
55,000 cusecs and 65,500 cusecs. See infra table 1.
49. See UPRETI, supra note 17, at 134.
50. The political climate that facilitated the conclusion of the 1975 Agreement, supra note
46, changed dramatically following the assassination of the president of Bangladesh, Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman on August 15,1975, and the army takeover. See ABBAS, supranote 39, at 44-
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It is also important to note that this initial agreement established
two principles that have been followed in all the subsequent agreements,
including the Ganges Treaty. The first principle is that the quantum of
water to be released by India to Bangladesh would be released at Farakka.
The second principle is that water withdrawn by India, and water released
to Bangladesh, would generally take place in ten-day increments, and in
the case of thirty-one day months would take place in eleven-day
increments."'
The second agreement was signed on November 5, 1977,2 and
covered the five lean seasons of 1978 through 1982. The allocation of the
available water between the two countries is shown in table 1 below.
Under the 1977 Agreement, it was established that during each dry
season Bangladesh's allotment of water would be about 59 percent of the
total availability of water in the Ganges River, and that India's share of
water would be about 41 percent. The most notable feature of the 1977
Agreement was that it included a clause that guaranteed Bangladesh a
minimum of 80 percent of its share of water during any ten-day period,
irrespective of how low the flow of the Ganges River might be during such
a periods
The third agreement was signed on October 7, 1982,' and was in
effect for two years. This agreement covered the lean seasons of 1983 and
1984, but did not cover the lean season of 1985.
The fourth agreement was signed on November 22, 1 9 85 ,a and
lasted for three years. It covered the three dry seasons of 1986, 1987, and
1988, and expired on May 31, 1988. Both of these agreements reiterated the
allocations agreed upon in the 1977 Agreement, and only made minor

51. See UPR, supra note 17; ABBAS, supranote 39.
52. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government

of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga Waters at Farakka and on
Augmenting its lows, Nov. 5,1977,17 LLM. 103 [hereinafter 1977 Agreement]. For the full
text of the Agreement, see, 17 .L.M. 103 (1978). See generally,Khan supra note 37, at 464-465

(discussions on the agreement); Tariq Hassan, InternationalAgreements-Ganges Water Treaty,
Bangladesh-India,Entered into ForceNov. 5,1977,19 HARV. lNTL LJ. 708 (1978).
53. See 1977 Agreement, supra note 52, art. H, § ii, at 54.
54. Indo-Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding, Oct. 7, 1982 [hereinafter 1982
MOUJ (on file with the authors). The 1982 MOU documented the agreements reached during
the meeting that was held in Delhi between Mr. H. M. Ershad, the then President of the
Council of Ministers, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, and Mrs. Indira
Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India at that time. For a general discussion, see
Khan, supra note 37, at 465-66.
55. Indo-Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding, Nov. 22,1985 [hereinafter 1985
MOUJ (on file with the authors). The 1985 MOU set out the agreements reached between the
then President of Bangladesh, Mr. H. M. Ershad, and the then Prime Minister of India, Mr.
Rajiv Gandhi, during their meeting at Nassau, the Bahamas in 1985.
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TABLE 1
Sharing of Waters at Farakka Barrage between the Dry Season,
Which Lasts from January 1 to May 31 of Each Year

Ten/Eleven Day
Increments

January

1-10
11-20
21-31

February 1-10
11-20
21-28/29

Flows reaching
Farakka (based
on 75% availability from
observed data
(1948-73)

Withdrawal
by India at
Farakka

Release to
Bangladesh

Cusecs

Cusecs

Cusecs

98,500
89,750
82,500

40,000
38,500
35,000

58,500
51,250
47,500

79,250
74,000
70,000

33,000
31,500
30,750

46,250
42,500
39,250

March

1-10
11-20
21-31

65,250
63,500
61,000

26,750
25,500
25,000

38,500
38,000
36,000

April

1-10
11-20
21-30

59,000
55,500
55,000

24,000
20,750
20,500

35,000
34,750
34,500

May

1-10
11-20
21-31

56,500
59,250
65,500

21,500
24,000
26,750

35,000
35,250
38,750

Source: Schedule to the 1977 Agreement
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adjustments to the allocations of water within some of the ten-day
increments. The total amounts of water withdrawn by India and the total
amount of water released to Bangladesh at Farakka, however, remained the
same.5
Interestingly indeed, the guarantee clause contained in the 1977
Agreement was not included in either of these agreements. Following the
expiration of the 1985 agreement, therefore, another vacuum, similar to the
one following the first agreement, was created that lasted for more than
eight years until the Ganges Treaty was concluded in December 1996.
IV. THE NEW REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATIES
In this section, the present political regime regarding the waters of
the Mahakali River and the Ganges River is discussed. It is important to
point out at the outset of this section that, whilst the Mahakali Treaty
emphasizes an integrated approach to the development of water resources,
the Ganges Treaty, and other previous agreements pertaining to the
Ganges River, have primarily been limited to the specific objective of water
allocation between India and Bangladesh during the dry season. Thus,
whereas the Mahakali Treaty attempts to validate past activities taken to
develop water resources on the Mahakali River, the Ganges Treaty
represents another attempt to equitably distribute the waters of the Ganges
River between India and Bangladesh during low-flow months, and also
represents the continued search for a long-term solution to the scarce flow
of the Ganges River during the dry season.
It is noteworthy that the Mahakali Treaty was signed in February
1996 when the Indian Congress Party was still in power in India, while the
Ganges Treaty was not concluded until after the Indian Congress Party was
voted out of office in March 1996. The Ganges Treaty was entered into
shortly after the United Front government was established in June 1996."
The March election results created an attitudinal shift in how foreign policy
was conducted in India. This election, in conjunction with the fresh
approach to foreign policy that focused on developing better relations with
India's neighboring countries under the Gujral Doctrine, facilitated the

56. See 1982 MOU, supra note 54, Annexure A, at 3; 1985 MOU, supra note 55, Annexure
A, at 4.
57. The United Front consisted of 13 regional parties and was initially led by Mr. Deve

Gowda. See Sukumar Muralidharan, A New Equilibrium:The Deve Gowda Government in Chwge,
FRONTLINE, June 15-28,1996, at 4.
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conclusion of the Ganges Treaty.' These factors most likely helped
facilitate ratification of the Mahakali Treaty in June 1997.
A. Integrated Approach to Water Resources Development under The
Mahakali Treaty
Against the above-described political climate, the need to validate
past activities carried out under the Tanakpur Agreement and the need to
improve the Mahakali water sharing arrangements became pressing.s It is
important for the purposes of this discussion to understand that the
Mahakali water sharing arrangements were governed primarily by the
Sarada Treaty, which was entered into when the political status of India
and the needs of the two countries were different. Indeed, whilst India at
the time was under British rule, the population of Nepal was small in size
with a relatively low demand for water, and as such, water sharing issues
were not afforded the same priority that they are currently given.
Considering the embedded views of both sides on the Tankapur
controversy, it took five years of negotiations after the Tanakpur agreement
was concluded before the foreign ministers of India and Nepal, Mr. Pranab
Mukheijee and Mr. Prakash C. Lohani, respectively, were able to initial, on
the twenty-ninth of January 1996, a treaty between the two countries for the
integrated development of water resources on the Mahakali River. Two
weeks later, on the twelfth of February 1996, the Mahakali Treaty was
signed by the Prime Minister of India, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, and the
Prime Minister of Nepal, Mr. Sher B. Deuba.'
The Mahakali Treaty deals with three projects related to water
resources: the Sarada Barrage, the Tanakpur Barrage, and the Pancheshwar
Multipurpose Project. Of these, it should be noted, the work at the Sarada
Barrage and the Tanakpur Barrage were completed in 1920 and 1992
respectively. The Mahakali Treaty absorbed the regime established by the

58. It was not just the change in government in Delhi that facilitated the conclusion of
the Ganges Treaty. In Dhaka, the Awami League, which had dose ties to India in the past,
was returned to power for the first time since 1975. Both the Prime Ministers of India and
Bangladesh met in Rome during the World Food Summit in November 1996. That meeting
was preceded by an official visit by the Foreign Minister of each country to the capital of the
other country. Mr. Gujral was the foreign minister of India at that time. See John Cherian,
Great Expectations.The India-BangladeshWater Issue, 13 FRONTLINE, Nov. 30-Dec. 13, 1996; India
and Bangladesh Reach Water Deal, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12,1996.
59. See text supra§ M(B).
60. The Mahakali Treaty, supranote 2, was signed in two originals each in Hindi, Nepali
and English languages, all the texts being equally authentic, and the English text prevailing,
in case of doubt. Similarly, the Ganges Treaty, supranote 3, was done in Hindi, Bangla, and
English, with the English text prevailing in the event of any conflict.
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Sarada Treaty, validated the controversial Tanakpur Agreement, 1 and
endorsed the idea of a new multipurpose project, the details of which, at
the time of its conclusion, still needed to be resolved.6
It is worth mentioning, however, that the Mahakali Treaty is a first
in many ways. Along these lines, the treaty lays down the principle that as
a boundary river on large stretches,' the Mahakali River will be developed
in an integrated way to maximize the total net benefit from such development. Both parties will, in theory, be entitled to equal benefits, and will
thus share the costs in proportion to the share of benefits they actually
receive. These principles, self-evident though they may be, were not
observed in earlier agreements between India and Nepal, including the two
existing projects on the Mahakali River, the Sarada and Tanakpur barrages,
which were located downstream from the site of the proposed
Pancheshwar Dam.
The Mahakali Treaty, however, has also engendered a wide
spectrum of debate within various segments of India's and Nepal's
populations concerning the hullaballoo and hoopla over the conclusion of
the treaty, the numerous hidden political agendas, environmental concerns,
and strategic choices with respect to the location of the dam and the actual
components of water sharing contained in the treaty. Addressing all the
aspects of the debate is beyond the scope of this article. Instead of dwelling
on controversial political issues, this article briefly analyzes the content of
the Mahakali Treaty and, as appropriate, compares it with the Ganges
Treaty.
1. DeclaratoryProvisions
The preamble of the Mahakali Treaty appears to be comprehensive.
It stresses the determination of India and Nepal to promote and strengthen
their relations of friendship and dose neighborliness for cooperation in the
development of water resources. Most importantly, the preamble recognizes that the Mahakali River is a boundary river on major stretches
between the two countries, and focuses on the need of the two countries to

61. See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, art. 12, § 1,36 LL.l 531,543. The Mahakali Treaty
incorporated the earlier understanding reached between India and Nepal, in the context of
the Sarada Treaty, supra note 18, and the Tanakpur Agreement, supra note 24, concerning the
utilization of the waters of the Mahakali river from the Sarada Barrage and the Tanakpur

Barrage.
62.

See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, Preamble, art. 3,36 LL.M. at 533,537.

63. Although often stressed to an extreme, international law does not draw any legal
distinction between boundary rivers and other successive rivers. The same rules of
international law apply to both types of rivers. This has been concluded by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the River Oder Case. For details, see The International
Commission of the River Oder, P.C.LJ., ser. A, No. 23, at 5,27 (1929).
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enter into a treaty on the basis of equal partnership to define their
obligations and corresponding rights and duties thereto with regards to the
utilization of the waters of the Mahakali River."
Moreover, the preamble references several existing instruments. It
refers to (1) the Exchange of Letters of 1920 through which both the parties
had entered into an arrangement for the construction of the Sarada Barrage
on the Mahakali River; (2) the decision taken by the Indo-Nepal Joint
Commission,' dated December 4-5, 1991, and the Joint Communiqud
issued during the visit of the Prime Minister of India to Nepal on October
21,1992, regarding the Tanakpur Barrage, and finally (3) a detailed project
report regarding the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project (PMP) that India
and Nepal intended to prepare and that was to be implemented on the
Mahakali River." In this context, it is worth noting that the Mahakali Treaty
does not mention the controversial MOU of December 1991. The critical
decision of the Nepalese Supreme Court on this MOU could have been the
main reason why it was not specifically mentioned in the preamble to the
69
treaty.
The Mahakali Treaty provides a false impression that the two
governments have taken a "basin approach" to water resource management. ' However, given the fact that the considerations used to negotiate
the treaty were limited to the tributaries covered by the future
Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project (PMP), and that the initial investigation

was limited in its examination of other water resource management
options, it is dear that the treaty only seeks to develop water resources at

the Pancheshwar Barrage. n From a structural viewpoint, the Mahakali
Treaty, in fact, combines three distinct treaties, the Sarada Treaty, the
Tanakpur Treaty, and the PMP, insofar as the principle for sharing water
and electricity between India and Nepal is concerned.
The preamble of the Ganges Treaty is less exhaustive but equally
optimistic. It reiterates the desire of the parties that waters from international rivers flowing in the territories of India and Bangladesh be shared
between them by mutual agreement, and that water resources of the region

64. See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, Preamble, 36 LL.M. at 533.
65. See id.
66. See id. The reference concerns the Joint Commission established by both the
governments to deal with all water-related issues.
67. See text supra § H(B).
68. See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, Preamble, 36 L.M. 531,533.
69. See AHMED, supra note 32, at 361, and accompanying text.
70. An approach where the basin is looked upon as having no international boundaries
and planning concepts are applied to the basin as a whole.
71. See Deepak Gyewali, Xe Ke Chan Dosh Mahakali Sandhi Ma, in 41 MULYANKAN 39
(1997).
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be put to the most beneficial use regarding flood management, irrigation
use, river basin development, and the development of hydro-power. The
preamble goes on to stress the need for a solution to the long-term problem
of augmenting the flow of the Ganges River during the dry season. In fact,
water sharing and augmentation are the only two concerns addressed by
the 1977 Agreement, each of the 1982 and 1985 MOUs, and the Ganges
Treaty. However, as we shall discuss later, India and Bangladesh have not
been able to agree on any scheme for augmentation.'
2. Status of Sarada and Tanakpur Barrages
a. Sarada Barrage
The first part of the Mahakali Treaty deals with the Sarada Barrage.
Accordingly, Nepal shall have the right to a supply of 1,000 cusecs of water
from the Sarada Barrage in the wet season, that is from May 15 to October
15, and 150 cusecs in the dry season, that is from October 16 to May 14. 73
Moreover, India is required to maintain a flow of not less than 350 cusecs
downstream of the Sarada Barrage in the Mahakali River to maintain and
preserve the river ecosystem.74
Section 1.03 of the Mahakali Treaty provides assurances to Nepal
that in case the Sarada Barrage becomes nonfunctional for any reason,
Nepal shall continue to have the right to a supply of 1,000 cusecs of water
by using the head regulator(s) constructed by India near the left
undersluice (an artificial passage of water fitted with a gate for stopping or
regulating flow) of the Tanakpur Barrage. This supply of water shall be
over and above the amount of water agreed upon by the treaty to be
supplied to Nepal. Moreover, in this case, India is also required to maintain
the river flow from the tailrace (the narrow channel for conveying water
away from the turbine after use) of the Tanakpur Power Station downstream of the Sarada Barrage."
b.

Tanakpur Barrage

The second part of the Mahakali Treaty deals with the Tanakpur
Barrage. According to Article 2, in continuation of the decisions taken in
the Joint Commission dated December 4-5,1991, and the Joint Communiqu6 issued during the visit of the Prime Minister of India to Nepal on
October 21, 1992, India and Nepal agreed to carry out some work in the
area. This work includes the construction of the eastern afflux bund of the

72.
73.
74.
75.

See text infra § IV(BX3).
See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1, § 2,36 I.L.M. 531,534.
See id.
See id., art. 1, § 3,36 I.LLM. at 535.
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Tanakpur Barrage at Jimuwa and tying it up to the high ground in the
Nepalese territory at an elevation level of 250 meters. For this purpose,
Nepal agreed to let India use a portion of its land consisting of about 577
meters in length (an area of about 2.9 hectares) in its territory at the Jimuwa
Village in Mahendranagar Municipal Area and a certain portion of the "noman's land" on either side of the border. The Mahakali Treaty explicitly
states that this land, and a tract of about 9 hectares of land to the West up
to the Indo-Nepalese border, continue to remain under the sovereignty and
control of Nepal, and that
Nepal would continue to be free to exercise all
76
attendant rights thereto.
In lieu of construction of the eastern afflux bund of the Tanakpur
Barrage at Jimuwa, Nepal obtained the right to a supply of 1,000 cusecs of
water during the wet season n and 300 cusecs of water during the dry
season.' For this purpose, as well as for the purpose of supplying water
from the Sarada Barrage, India agreed to construct the head regulator(s)
near the left undersluice of the Tanakpur Barrage and build waterways
with appropriate water capacity all the way to the Indo-Nepalese border.
Such head regulator(s) and waterways are to be operated jointly by India
and Nepal."
In this context, it is worth adding that, pursuant to the Letter of
Exchange (the Letter) between the prime ministers of India and Nepal on
the day the Treaty was signed, India also agreed to complete an all-weather
road connecting the Tanakpur Barrage to the east-west highway at
Mahendranagar in Nepal within one year of the effective date of the
°
Mahakali Treaty.W
Regarding electricity, Nepal is entitled to an annual supply of 70
million kilowatt-hours on a continuous basis free of cost, from the effective
date of the Mahakali Treaty. For this purpose, India agreed to construct a
132 Kv transmission line all the way to the Indo-Nepalese border from the
Tanakpur Power Station." This letter further clarified that the annual

76. See id., art. 2, § 1, 36 I.L.M. at 535.
77. The wet season is the period starting May 15 and ending October 15.
78. The dry season is the period starting October 16 and ending May 14. t is noteworthy
that the dry season under the Ganges Treaty and previous agreements is from January 1 to
May 31.
79. See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2, § 2(a), 36 I.L.M. 531,536.
80. Letter of Exchange between the Prime Minster of Nepal and the Prime Minister of
India (Feb. 12,1996), 36 LL.M. 544 (1997) [hereinafter the Letter]. The Letter was originally
sent by the Prime Minister of Nepal, and on the same date the Prime Minister of India
acknowledged and confirmed that the Letter correctly set out the agreement made between
the two Governments.
81. See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2, § 2(b), 36 I.L.M. at 536. Tanakpur Barrage
has, at the time of its completion, an installed capacity of 120,000 kilowatts, and could
generate 448.4 million kilowatt-hours annually.
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supply of 20 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, free of cost, to Nepal from
the Tanakpur Power Station, as provided for in the Mahakali Treaty, shall
be reconciled with the energy procured or to be procured by Nepal from
India under the existing power exchange arrangement. This supply of
electricity was previously authorized by the Joint Communiqud beginning
when the Tanakpur Power Station was commissioned July 7,1992, and was
to remain in effect until the power station was able to meet its expected
annual supply of 70 million kilowatt-hours of electricity.'
The Mahakali Treaty also described the arrangements that would
be made at the Tanakpur Barrage at the time of development of any storage
project(s), including the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project upstream of
the Tanakpur Barrage.' Accordingly, additional head regulators and
necessary waterways, as required by the treaty, were to be constructed up
to the Indo-Nepalese border to supply additional water to Nepal. Such
head regulators and waterways would be operated jointly by both Nepal
and India.' Moreover, Nepal would have additional energy equal to half
of the incremental energy generated from the Tanakpur Power Station on
a continuous basis from the date of augmentation of the flow of the
Mahakali River. Under this agreement, Nepal was obligated to bear half of
the additional operation costs and, if required, half of the additional capital
costs of the Tanakpur Power Station for the generation of this incremental
energy.0e
The notion of augmentation of the flow of the Mahakali River is
mentioned both in the treaty and the letter. Since there are no details as to
how such augmentation is to take place, one can only assume that the
augmentation will be part of the Detailed Project Report.
3. PancheshwarMultipurposeProject
Although it is a very important part of the treaty, the newly
introduced Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project (PMP) remains a controversial aspect of the Mahakali Treaty. The PMP8 ' is to be constructed on a
stretch of the Mahakali River that forms the boundary between the two
countries. The Mahakali Treaty specifies that both India and Nepal have
equal entitlement to utilize the waters of the Mahakali River without
prejudice to their respective existing consumptive uses.' The Mahakali

82. See the Letter, supra note 80, 112, 36 LL.M. at 536.
83.
84.

See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2, § 3,36 LL.M. at 536.
See id. art. 2, § 3(a), 36 I.LM. at 537.

85. See id.§ 3(b).
86. The treaty includes, inter alia, the const uction of a 315-meter high dam (Pancheshwar
Dam) with a capacity for generating 3,480 MW of electricity. See Rishikesh Shah, Whither
Mahakali Treaty?, KATHMANDU PoSr, Sept. 4,1997, at 1.
87. See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3,36 I.L.M. at 537.
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Treaty further specifies that both countries agree to implement the PMP on
the Mahakali River in accordance with the Detailed Project Report (DPR)
being jointly prepared by the countries.8'
The Mahakali Treaty also added, in this context, that India would
supply 350 cusecs of water for the irrigation of the Dodhara-Chandani area
this supply still need to
in Nepal. The technical and other details regarding
8
be worked out and mutually agreed upon. '
a. General Principles
Along with the issues of water distribution, power generation, and
energy sharing, the Mahakali Treaty established some other general
principles. While the water requirements of Nepal are to be given prime
consideration," both India and Nepal are entitled to draw their share of
waters from the Mahakali River at the Tanakpur Barrage and/or other
mutually agreed upon points as provided for by the Mahakali Treaty or
any subsequent agreement between the two countries. Moreover, any
project, other than the Sarada, the Tanakpur, and the PMP, to be developed
on the international boundary area of the Mahakali River in the future will
need to be designed and implemented by agreement between the two
countries using the principles established by the Mahakali Treaty.'
Maintaining the flow and level of water in the Mahakali River is
another general principle established by the Mahakali Treaty. According
to Article 7, India and Nepal each agreed, subject to future agreements to
the contrary, not to use, obstruct, or divert the waters of the Mahakali
River, so as to adversely affect the natural flow and level of the river. This
requirement does not preclude the use of the waters of the Mahakali River
by the local communities living along both sides of the Mahakali River as
long as such use does not exceed five percent of the average annual flow
at Pancheshwar. 3 Furthermore, the Mahakali Treaty does not preclude
either country from planning, surveying, developing, and using any of the
tributaries originating from the Mahakali River, as long as such activities
take place in each country's own territory and do not adversely affect the
flow of the Mahakali River.

88.

See id.

89.

See id. art. 4, 36 I.L.M. at 538.

90. See id. art. 5, 36 LLM. at 539.
91. See id.
92.

See id. art. 6, 36 I.M. at 539.

93.

See id. arts. 6,7,36 I.LM. at 539-40. The Ganges Treaty includes a similar provision,

stating that the waters released to Bangladesh shall not be reduced below Farakka except for

reasonable uses of waters, not exceeding 200 cusecs, by India between Farakka and where the
Ganges enters Bangladesh. See Ganges Treaty, supra note 3, art. 1H, 36 ULM. 519.
94. See Mahakali Treaty, supranote 2, art. 8, 36 LLM. 531,539-40.
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b. Specific PrinciplesRegardingthe PMP
The Mahakali Treaty establishes four main principles for the design
and implementation of the PMP. Accordingly, the first principle is that the
PMP will be designed to produce the maximum total net benefit for both
countries in the forms of power generation, irrigation use, and flood
control."5 These benefits will be assessed on a continual basis to insure
maximum performance. The second principle regarding the construction
of the PMP is that both countries are working together in an integrated
manner to develop and share their water resources. Indeed, the PMP will
be implemented as a joint effort that includes the erection of power stations
of equal capacity on each side of the Mahakali River. The two power
stations will be operated together and the total energy generated will be
shared equally between India and Nepal.'
The third principle is that both countries will share the cost of the
project. As specified in the Mahakali Treaty, India and Nepal will share the
cost of the PMP in proportion to the benefits accruing to each, and will
jointly
endeavor to mobilize the financing required to implement the
97
pMP.
The fourth principle is that a portion of Nepal's share of energy
will be sold to India. The quantum of such energy and its price shall be
mutually agreed upon between the parties."
In addition, the Letter of Exchange (the Letter) between the Prime
Ministers of Nepal and India regarding the Mahakali Treaty also establishes principles to be applied and arrangements to be made in finalizing
the Detailed Project Report (DPR), completing negotiations, and implementing the PMP. Accordingly, this Letter mandates that the DPR must be
finalized by both countries within six months from the effective date of the
Mahakali Treaty," and provides that the exchange of necessary data and

95. See id. art. 3, § 1,36 LLM. at 537.
96. See id. art.3 § 1.
97. See id. art. 3, § 3,36 I.L.M. at 538.
98. See id. art. 3, § 4,36 .LM. at 538. In order to maximize its revenues from the project,
Nepal has been keen to maximize the power component, and to design the project as a
peaking station to run for about four and a half hours a day. India's own preference initially
was for a project with a lower capacity of about 2000 MW operating over a longer number of
hours. However, India has agreed to go along with Nepal, given an expected deficit in
peaking power of about 20,000 MW in the northern grid by the time the project comes on line
in about 2010. See Pancheshua:Challenges Ahead, ECON. TIMES, July 2,1997, at 144.
99. The Mahakali Treaty was ratified on June 5,1997. As of the writing of this article, the
DPR has not yet been finalized. The technical team, composed of water resources officials
from India and Nepal met to finalize the DPR and requested that their respective
governments give them another two years to prepare it. See Two Years Extension Sought to
Prepare PancheshwarDPR, KATHMANDU Posr, Dec. 11, 1997, at 1.
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reports be done expeditiously. The Letter clarifies further that during the
preparation of the DPR and the accompanying assessment of the benefits
to each country as a result of the construction of the PMP an assessment of
irrigation benefits would also be conducted. The Letter directed that the
assessment of irrigation benefits for both countries should focus on
incremental and additional benefits due to augmentation of river flow, and
on the value of works saved and damages avoided due to increased flood
control resulting from construction of the PMP. Likewise, the Letter
instructs that the net power benefits will be assessed on the basis of savings
in costs to the two countries as compared with the relevant alternatives
available.' This comparison of cost with available alternatives is likely to
emerge and remain as another contentious issue.'1
The Letter further precludes claims, in any form, by either country
on the unutilized portion of its share of the waters of the Mahakali River."0
The Letter also specifies that an agreement for the financing and implementation of the PMP, including the proposal for the establishment of the
Pancheshwar Development Authority, must be negotiated and finalized by
both countries within one year from the finalization of the DFR.les It should
also be noted that pursuant to the Mahakali Treaty, a Mahakali River
Commission would be appointed to oversee the Pancheshwar Development Authority. The Commission would be comprised of an equal number
of members from both countries, and, in the event of disputes, both
countries must submit to resolution of the dispute by independent
arbitration.'" This is indeed a breakthrough. Rarely are such projects
between countries financed, implemented, and operated jointly by a
binational authority.
The target date for completion of construction of the PMP is eight
years from the date of the agreement, subject to the completion of the DPR.
To expedite the implementation of the PMP, the Letter further provides

100. See the Letter, supranote 80, 1 3(a).
101. Indeed, a unanimous resolution of the Nepalese Parliament stated that the principle
of "avoided cost" should be the only criterion. Even if it is decided that the price should be
somewhere between avoided cost and the actual cost of generation, the question remains,
what is the relevant alternative, especially for peaking power? Pancheshwar:ChallengesAhead,
supranote 98. It should also be added that the absence of a dear principle for pricing of power
is even more serious because of the situation of a defacto single-buyer monopoly. See Gyewali,
supranote 71, at 39.
102. See the Letter, supra note 80, 1 3(b).
103. See id. I 3(b).
104. See Mahakall Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 1,11, 36 I.LLM. 531,534-35,541-42. While there
are binational hydro projects in other parts of the world, the largest being the 12,600 MW
Itaipu Dam between Brazil and Paraguay, Pancheshwar will be the first truly binational
project in the Ganges Basin, and could serve as a model for cooperative development of its
vast hydropower resources. See Pancheshwar:Challenges Ahead, supranote 98.
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that field investigation and detailed design, including tender document
preparation, should start immediately after the finalization of the DPR and
should parallel the negotiations necessary to implement the PMP. For this
purpose, the Letter also specifies that both countries need to agree on a
separate financing agreement to carry out these activities. 1 5
Thus, in spite of the detailed stipulations that the Treaty and the
Letter have established, the implementation of the PUP, which is the ra/son
d'etre of the Mahakali Treaty, relies heavily on a financing package that the
two governments will have to obtain.
4. Water Sharing Issues
The provisions regarding Nepal's share of the waters of the
Mahakali River under the Mahakali Treaty are scattered throughout the
treaty. Read together, Nepal's share of water stipulated by the treaty can
be consolidated as reflected in table 2 below:
TABLE 2
Source

Wet season

Dry season

Sarada Barrage

1000 cusecs

150 cusecs

Tanakpur

1000 cusecs

300 cusecs

350 cusecs

350 cusecs

2350 cusecs

800 cusecs

Dodhara-Chandani

Source: Articles 1,2 and 3 of the Mahakali Treaty
The Mahakai Treaty appears to have attempted to follow a model07
6
based on the principles of "equitable utilization"' and "no harm."1

105.

See the Letter, supra note 80,

3(d). As such,this appears to be an agreement to agree.

106. Equitable utilization has been defined as "the division of the waters of an international river among the co-riparian states in accordance with the legitimate economic and social
needs of each, in such a manner as to achieve the maximum benefits for all
with a minimum
of detriment to each." Upper, supra note 1,at 63. The International Law Association Helsinki
Rules, art. 5, 52 LLA. 484 (1967), on the use of the waters of international rivers, lay down a
number of factors for determining what is a reasonable and equitable share. Such factors:
include, but are not limited to the following.
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the
drainage area in the territory of each basin State;
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However, in spite of the attempt to follow these models, the treatment of
these two notions is not completely clear. The provisions regarding the
sharing of water of the Mahakali River thus raise some issues. Articles 3
and 5.1 of the Mahakali Treaty, as well as paragraph 3(b) of the Letter,
when read together, result in some ambiguity. For instance, according to

(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of
water by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular
existing utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f)the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and
social needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the
basin;
(j)the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as
a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without
causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.
On the other hand, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, May 21,1997, art. 6 (1), 36 LL.M 700, states:
Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all
relevant factors and circumstances, including the following;
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other
factors of a natural character,
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
(c) The population dependent on the watercourses in the watercourses State;
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State
on other watercourses States;
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourses;
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of the water
resources of the watercourse and the cost of measures taken to that effect;
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular

planned or existing use.
The Convention was adopted by a vote of 103 in favor, 3 against (Burundi, China, and
Turkey), and 27 abstentions. It should be added that, while Bangladesh and Nepal voted in
favor of the Convention, India abstained. For the full text of the Convention, see 36 LLM. 700

(1997).
107. The "no harm" ndegusuo mado means that riparian states cannot act as they pleae
They are not allowed to use or tolerate the use of their water for causing harm to the other
states. The no harm rule covers a whole range of neighborly relations, including issues
pertaining to the protection of environment. This rule is also reflected in the 1997 Convention
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, supra note 106.
Indeed, in accordance with the Convention, watercourse states are required, in utilizing an
international watercourse in their territories, to take all appropriate measures to prevent the
causing of significant harm to other watercourse states. See id. art. 7.1.
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Article 3 of the Mahakali Treaty, both India and Nepal agreed that they
have equal entitlement to use the waters of the Mahakali River without
prejudice to their respective existing consumptive uses of the waters of the
Mahakali River. Thus the Mahakali Treaty protects the "respective
consumptive use of the waters of the Mahakali River" without actually
specifying the nature of the use."'
The Letter, moreover, in paragraph 3(b) contains some restrictions
as to the notion of equal entitlement. It states,
it is understood that Section 3 of Article 3 of the Mahakali
Treaty precludes the claim, in any form, by either party on
the unutilized portion of the shares of the waters of the
Mahakali River of that Party without affecting the provision
of the withdrawal of the respective shares of the water of the
Mahakali River by each Party under this treaty.
These provisions do not guarantee that equal entitlement of water,
from a Nepalese standpoint, should be half of the total use for each
country."° The term "existing consumptive use" is a key phrase adding to
the confusion. Its full and meaningful implementation requires that the
countries first identify the "existing consumptive use" of both India and
Nepa. 11 Only then can the phrase "without prejudice to their respective
existing consumptive uses" be objectively applied. Unfortunately, the
Mahakali Treaty defines Nepal's existing consumptive use,"1 but does not
do so for India and, therefore, leaves open an opportunity for India to
unilaterally define the scope of its consumptive use.
The resulting ambiguity caused by this provision contradicts the
spirit of Article 5.1 of the Mahakali Treaty, which states that the water
requirements of Nepal are to be given prime consideration. Furthermore,
although Nepal's prospective water requirements are to be given priority,
its existing and prospective water requirements are small in proportion to
India's water requirements, and may impact Nepal's plans to forgo part of

108. See K.L. SHRwSiA, MAHAKAu SANDHI RA RASTRIYA HIrTro SAwAL 32-33 (1997)
(Kathmandu, Nepal).
109. In order to avoid any confusion, it should be mentioned that equality of right, in
international law, does not give a co-riparian the right to an equal division of the waters.
Rather, equality of right is the equal right of each co-riparian state to a division of the waters
on the basis of its economic and social needs, consistent with the corresponding rights of its
co-riparian states, and excluding from consideration factors unrelated to such needs. This
formula will, of course, often result in a compromise that will permit each co-riparian state
to satisfy its needs to the greatest extent possible, with a minimum of detriment to each. See
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supr note 1, at 63.
110. See Ajay Dixit, Mahakali Nadi Sajha Ho, PaaniAdha Ko Adha Ho, 42 MULYANKAN 8-9
(1997).
111. See id.; Gyewali, supra note 71, at 39; SHREsTI, s--ra note 108, at 23,32-33.
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its water entitlement for12a proportionately lower share of the costs of the
non-hydro component
The negotiators, however, have had difficulty ascertaining what
share of costs each country must pay. Even if the power component is
assumed to cost about 80 percent of the total cost of the project," small
differences in the apportionment of the remaining 20 percent can translate
into hundreds of crores.1 Nepal believes that India is overstating its
existing utilization of water flows in order to minimize its share of
incremental irrigation and flood control benefits from the project,"
especially since India in the past has claimed that it uses up to three times
the amount of water that it is now claiming."'
Additionally, these claims by India are higher in some months than
either the amount of water observed in the river at specified times, or the
water capacity of the Sarada Canal into which the bulk of the flows are
diverted by the Sarada Barrage in India. This has partly to do with the link
canal India has built between the Ghaghra and the Sarada canal system to
supplement the Sarada River." 7 India, however, argues that the canal is
used only for part of the year because the Ghaghra River carries a heavy
load of silt during and after the rains, which would build up in the canal
and cause blockage. For the rest of the year, India claims that the flows it
utilizes come from the Mahakali River itself11
India estimates that augmentation of flows by the PMP, unassisted
by the waters of the Ghaghra River, will enable it to raise the intensity of
spring irrigation from 26 to 50 percent in a command area of about two
million hectares in the State of Uttar Pradesh."' This would correspond to
utilization of only half the augmented waters, and a cost share of eight
percent. Although its share of flows would remain largely unutilized,
Nepal's cost share would also remain at eight percent. The remaining four
percent would be apportioned to flood control benefits.'"

112. See Pancheshwar: Challenges Ahead, supra note 98. Non-hydro component in this
context includes all components related to the water use except hydropower.
113. The total cost of the project may be as much as Rs. 15,000 crore, or Rs 2.5 crore per
megawatt. A crore is a unit of account used in most South Asian countries and is equivalent
to ten million.
114. See Pancheshwar:ChallengesAhead, supra note 98.
115. See Gyewali, supra note 71, at 74; SHRESTHA, supranote 108.
116. See Gyewali, supra note 71.
117. See Pancheshwar:Challenges Ahead, supra note 98.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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B. Sharing the Ganges
1. Water Sharing Under the Ganges Treaty
Compared with the Indo-Nepal Mahakali Treaty, the IndoBangladesh Ganges Treaty, insofar as water sharing is concerned, seems
clearer. Whilst the Mahakali Treaty fails to establish any clear formula for
water sharing between the two countries, the Ganges Treaty actually sets
out the techniques and mechanisms for water sharing between India and
Bangladesh.
Regarding the sharing of waters from the Ganges River, the
attempts in the previous agreements as well as the Ganges Treaty itself
centered on the notion of equitable utilization. ' Annexure 1 to the Ganges
Treaty (Table 3 below) establishes the following formula, which includes
the threshold amounts of water available at Farakka, along with each
country's share of water stated either as a percentage, or as an amount, of
that threshold.
TABLE 3
Availability
At Farrakka
70,000 cusecs or less

India's
Share

Bangladesh's
Share

50%

50%

70,000 - 75,000 cusecs Balance of flow
75,000 cusecs or more 40,000 cusecs

35,000 cusecs
Balance of flow

Source: Annexure 1 of the Ganges Treaty' 22

121. For the definition of "equitable utilization", see text supra note 106.
122. It should be noted that the figure '70,000" has been repeated in both the first and
second lines of Annexure Iabove, and the figure "75,000" is also repeated in both the second
and third lines above. As such, if availability at Farakka is exactly 70,000 cusecs, the formula
in the first or second line could apply. Similarly, if the availability is exactly 75,000 cusecs, the

formula in the second or third line could apply. Perhaps a better way of drafting Annexure

1 to the Treaty could have been for the first line to read -less than 70,000 cusecs" and for the
third line to read "more than 75,000."
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In spite of the above, according to Annexure 1 of the Treaty, India
and Bangladesh are guaranteed each to receive 35,000 cusecs of water in
alternate three ten-day periods between March I to May 10 .11 In addition
to the above formula, Annexure II to the treaty includes an indicative
schedule (Table 4 below) depicting each country's share of water between
January 1 to May 31 of each year.
The Treaty states further that "[elvery effort would be made by the
upper riparian to protect flows of water at Farakka as in the 40 year
average availability mentioned above."" Moreover, in case the flow of the
Ganges River at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusecs in any ten-day period the
treaty provides for "...immediate consultation to make adjustments on an
emergency basis, in accordance with the principles of equity, fair play and
no harm to either party. " "5
In accordance with the schedule, as displayed in Table 4, India's
total share of water during the lean season amounts to about 48 percent of
the total available water, whereas Bangladesh's share represents about 52
percent. The schedule also specifies the three ten-day periods during which
35,000 cusecs shall be provided, alternately, to each of the two countries.
For Bangladesh these periods are between March 11 to 20, April I to 10,
and April 21 to 30, whereas for India they are between March 21 to 31,
April 11 to 20, and May 1 to 10. The period from March 11 to May 10 is
considered the most critical period of the lean season because the flow of
the Ganges River during this period is usually the lowest of the lean
1
season.

7

Reading Annexures 1 and II together (see tables 3 and 4), the
following can be noted:
1. Of the fifteen ten-day periods of the dry season, there are six
ten-day periods that are governed by the first part of the sharing formula
in Annexure 1. This formula allocates 50 percent of the available water
(70,000 cusecs or less) to each of the two countries. These six ten-day
periods, however, also correspond to the period in which each country is
guaranteed a share of 35,000 cusecs of water in alternate three ten-day
periods.
2. The indicative schedule shows that there are two ten-day
periods in which the availability of water at Farakka is between 70,000 and
75,000 cusecs. During those two periods, the second part of the sharing
123. See Ganges Treaty, supra note 3, Annexure 1, tbl. 1, 36 ILM. 519,527.
124. See id.art I, 1 ii, 36 LL.M at 524. This Article does not seem to oblige India to protect
the flow of the Ganges as in the 40 years average, but rather asks India to make every effort
for this purpose. It is interesting that in this Article the Treaty uses the term "upper riparian"
as opposed to actually naming India in the rest of the Treaty.
125. See id. art. IL
126. See id. Annexure 2,36 I.L.M. at 528.
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TABLE 4
The opening paragraph of the schedule states that if actual
availability corresponds to average flows of the period from
1949 to 1988, the implications of the formula in Annexure I
for the share of each side are the following:
Period

Average of
total flow
1949-88
(Cusecs)

India's Share

(Cusecs)

Bangladesh's
Share
(Cusecs)

Jan
1-10
11-20
21-31

107,516
97,673
90,154

40,000
40,000
40,000

67,516
57,673

Feb.
1-10
11-20
21-28

86,323
82,859
79,106

40,000
40,000
40,000

46,323
42,859
39,106

March
1-10
11-20
21-31

74,419
68,931
64,688

39,419
33,931
35,000*

35,000
35,000*
29,688

April
1-10
11-20
21-30

63,180
62,633
60,992

28,180
35,000*
25,992

35,000*
27,633
35,000*

May
1-10
11-20
21-31

67,351
73,590
81,854

35,000*

32,351
35,000
41,854

38,590

40,000

50,154

*Three ten-day periods during which 35,000 cusecs shall be
provided.
Source: Annexure 2 "schedule" to the Ganges Treaty
formula (second line of Annexure 1) is to be applied, and Bangladesh's
share will be 35,000 cusecs, with the remaining balance going to India.
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3. The third part of the sharing formula, (third line of the
Annexure) has been applied to the remaining seven ten-day periods, and
India's share is 40,000 cusecs, with the remaining balance of the flow going
to Bangladesh.
In comparing the share of each country under the earlier agreements and the Treaty, it is important to note that Bangladesh's share of
water has decreased from about 59 percent under the 1977 Agreement, and
each of the 1985 and 1982 MOUs, to about 52 percent under the present
treaty. Correspondingly, India's share increased from about 41 percent
under the 1977 Agreement, and the 1985 and 1982 MOUs, to about 48
percent under the present treaty.
2. The Working of the Ganges Treaty During the First Year 1997
An important feature distinguishing the previous agreements and
the present treaty is the basis used to calculate the flows of the Ganges
River reaching Farakka during the lean season. Under the previous
agreements, the average flows of the Ganges River that reached Farakka
were based on 75 percent water availability from observed data for the 25year period between 1948 and 1973. Under the present Treaty, the figures
under the indicative schedule are based on the average total flow, and not
on 75 percent availability of the Ganges during the 40 year period between
1949 and 1988.w As a result, the average total flows of the Ganges River
under the Treaty for each ten-day period exceeds the average flow under
the previous agreements for the same period by a margin of almost 10
percent for each period. This means that the Treaty assumes that a higher
level of water is available in the Ganges River at Farakka during the dry
season than under the previous agreements. 1"
However, a few months after the Treaty was concluded, it was
determined that the actual availability of water during the first lean season
of the Treaty of 1997 was far less than the average flows of the Ganges
River for the period 1949-1988, as indicated i" Annexure II to the Treaty.
The first reports of a decline in the flow of the Ganges River at Farakka
started circulating during the last ten days of February 1997 when the flow
was supposed to favor Bangladesh. During that period, Bangladesh stated
that it had received only 24,559 cusecs of water, instead of 39,106 cusecs as

127. See id. Apparently the year 1988 was chosen because it was the last year in which
daily flows of the Ganges at Farakka were observed and recorded by the India/Bangladesh
Joint Committee under the 1985 MOU.
128. Comparethe 1977 Agreement, supra note 52, col. 2, the 1982 MOU, supra note 54, and
the 1985 MOU, supra note 55, with the Ganges Treaty, supra note 3.
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stipulated by the treaty.' The situation became quite serious in late March,
and especially on March 27, when the reported water flow in the Ganges
River in Bangladesh was recorded at only 6,500 cusecs, the lowest ever.'"
By early April, the flow kept fluctuating between 10,000 and 25,000
cusecs," and by early May, water availability at Farakka was only about
40,000 cusecs, instead of the 67,351 cusecs specified by the Treaty.' It is
ironic to note that this substantially low flow occurred during the period
in which India and Bangladesh are, in accordance with the Treaty,
guaranteed to receive 35,000 cusecs of water in alternate three 10-day
periods. The indicative schedule under the Treaty shows the average
availability of more than 60,000 cusecs. " Since the flow of the Ganges
River continued to be below 50,000 cusecs, Bangladesh, lacking a guarantee
clause similar to that of the 1977 Agreement, 3 asked India for "immediate
consultation to make adjustments on an emergency basis" as stipulated
under Article II (iii) of the Treaty. India agreed to hold immediate
consultation with Bangladesh, and a series of meetings were held at Dhaka
and New Delhi.' During the meetings, Bangladesh demanded that India

129. See Ibne Mahfuz, Water Treaty Remains as Elusive as Ever?, DIALOGUE, Apr. 14,1997,
at I (Dhaka); Asadullah Khan, Implementation of the Ganges Treaty, a View from Dhaka, PEOPLE'S
REVIEW, May 8, 1997, at Opinion Page ("In the last ten days of February, 39,106 cusecs of
water should have been available at the Hardinge Bridge point. But Bangladesh got 27,906
cusecs on 22nd of February, 23,094 cusecs on the 23rd Feb., 22,295 cusecs on 24 Feb., 25,654
cusecs on the 25th Feb., 23,006 cusecs on 26th Feb., and 24,559 cusecs on 27th Feb., and on
March 27, the flow was lowest in recent times, recording 6,457 cusecs.").
130. See John F. Bums, Sharing Ganges Waters, India and Bangladesh Test the Depth of
Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,1997, at 6. The figure of 6,500 cusecs for March 27th appeared
in a number of newspapers.
131. See Bangladesh Asks India to Review Water Accord, REuTERi,Apr. 4,1997.
132. See supratbl. 4.
133. See Ganges Treaty, supn note 3, Annexure 1, 36 LLM. at 527. The proviso is unusual
in that it does not specify who is to guarantee that such amounts will actually be delivered.
Once the availability came down to such a low level, the inoperativeness of the guarantee
became discernible.
134. Article H of the 1977 Agreement, supra note 52,17 I.L.M. at 104, stated that if during
a particular 10-day period, the Ganga flows at Farakka come down to such a level that the
share of Bangladesh is lower than 80 percent of the value shown in column 4, the release of
waters to Bangladesh during that 10-day period shall not fall below 80 percent of that value.
135. On March 27, 1997, a senior Bangladesh government official arrived in Delhi to
discuss the situation with the Indian counterpart who took the position that the low flow was
due to natural circumstances. This visit was followed by another visit to Dhaka by an Indian
Team to discuss the same issues. The foreign ministers of the two countries met in New Delhi
on April 9; denied that the treaty was in jeopardy, even though the availability of water at
Farakka was abnormally low; and reiterated their commitment to the treaty. On May 13,
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina met the newly elected Indian Prime Minister, Inder Kumar
Gujral, during the summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) in Male, the capital of the Maldives. Both Prime Ministers confirmed that the issues
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ensure that Bangladesh would receive the 35,000 cusecs guaranteed under
Annexure 1 of the Treaty, and also that India communicate the steps it was
taking to protect the flow of water at Farakka, as per Article U (ii) of the
Treaty. India confirmed that the flow at Farakka had slowed down and
attributed this situation to the normal hydrological cycle that occurs every
four to five years,' and stated that it was complying with its obligations
under the Treaty by agreeing to immediate consultation. However, aside
from affirming that the two countries are committed to complying with the
provisions of the Treaty, the meetings did not result in any adjustments to
the share of water of either country, nor were any actions agreed upon to
remedy the situation. 7
Meanwhile, by mid-May, "unseasonal spring rains [had] eased the
crisis, with the river at Hardinge Bridge back to levels that normally
develop later in the spring, when rising summer heat on the north Indian
Plains melts snow in the Himalayas. " ' In mid-June, an expert-level
meeting of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission was held in
Dhaka. After three days of discussions that centered on the Treaty, the
Commission recommended that a scientific committee be formed to study
the causes of the low water flow of the Ganges River during the critical
period of the dry season. The thirty-second meeting of the Joint Rivers
Commission was held at Dhaka on July 18 to 20, 1997.' The Joint
Communique stated
The two sides appreciated the need to remove the bottlenecks
in implementation of the Ganga/Ganges Treaty with further
needing resolution regarding the Ganges Treaty had been worked out.
136. See Mahfuz, supra note 129. The Minister of Water Resources in Bangladesh told
Reuters on April 1, 1997, that India informed him that "ice in the Himalayas where the
Ganges originates is not melting enough to raise the level." Bangladesh Asks India to Review
Water Accord, supra note 131.
137. On April 11, 1997, the ten-month-old government headed by Mr. Deve Gowda was
voted out of office, and it was not until April 21 that Mr. Inder Kumar Gujral was selected as
a Prime Minister. The political vacuum, and later, the transition, might have hindered
Bangladesh's efforts to resolve the problem through political means. This was manifested by
the cancellation of the meeting of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission that was
supposed to take place in April 1997. Sukumar Muralidharan, Crisis and Resolution. The
Ascendence of lnderKumar Guiral,FRoNTLINE, May 16,1997, at 4.
138. See Burns, supra note 130.
139. Joint Communique of the 32nd Meeting of the India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers
Commission, Dhaka (July 18-20,1997) [hereinafter Joint Communique]. The Indo-Bangladesh
Joint Rivers Commission was established by the two governments in 1972. The main functions
of the Commission include maintaining a liaison between the two countries in order to ensure
the most effective joint efforts in order to maximize the benefits of managing the common
river systems for both countries. For the Statute of the Joint Rivers Commission, see ABBAS,
supra note 39, at 138. There are 51 minor rivers in addition to the Ganges, Brahmaputra and
Meghna shared between India and Bangladesh. See CROW ET AL, supra note 10, at 185-86.
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negotiations. It was decided to undertake joint scientific
studies in accordance with the terms of reference, which have
been jointly
finalized by the technical teams of the two
24
countries.

The unusual seasonal variations of water, one of the main
characteristics of the Ganges River, continued, and by early August 1997,
the Bangladesh Flood Information Center started issuing warnings that the
Ganges River flow was above the danger mark, and that certain areas could
soon be flooded. Thus, the 1997 dry season ended with mixed results, a
reasonable flow of the Ganges during the beginning and the end of the dry
season, and unusually low flow during the critical period of the dry
season."" Yet, unlike the previous dry seasons, when similar problems of
low flow of the Ganges persisted, this time the parties were actively
engaged in discussions on how to handle the situation within the framework of the Treaty. It is perhaps too early to tell whether this unusually
low flow of the Ganges River during the dry season of 1997 was an isolated
phenomenon that could be attributed to natural causes, or will continue to
be the trend.
3. Augmentation of the Flow of the Ganges
The major objective of the Ganges Treaty, as stated above, is to
develop a framework in which India and Bangladesh can work together to
share the waters of the Ganges River during the dry season. A secondary,
but related objective, referred to in the Treaty but not detailed, is the issue
of developing methods to augment the flow of the Ganges River during the
dry season. The 1977 Agreement identified and recorded the problem of
low flow of the Ganges during the dry season, and recognized the need for
both countries to cooperate with each other to find a method for augmenting the flow during the dry season. The 1977 Agreement further entrusted
the Joint Rivers Commission with the responsibility of carrying out
investigations and studying schemes in order to develop solutions to
increase the flow of the Ganges River during the dry season. The Commission was directed to present its recommendations to the governments of
Bangladesh and India within a period of three years.' Unfortunately, no

140. See Joint Communique, sqpra note 139; Haroon Habib, Pacton Teesta Waters on Anvil,
HINDU, July 21,1997, at I (India).
141. The DAILY STAR (Bangladesh) reported in mid-May that the Minister of Water
Resources admitted in parliament that the country had received less than the agreed quantum
of the Ganges water in some of the ten-day cycles during the last four months, but quoted him
as saying "we got more water than mentioned in the agreement in some cycles, while less in
others." World Bank Group, News from the Triangle Region (visited May 15, 1997)
<http://staffesse@worldbank.org).
142. See 1977 Agreement, supranote 52, arts. VIH, IX., 17 IL.M.at 104-05.
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such recommendations were agreed upon during the life of the 1977
Agreement.
The 1982 MOU dwelt on the same issue. It stated that "...the basic
problem of inadequate flow of waters in the Ganga available at Farakka
imposed sacrifices on both countries," and that "the long term solution lay
in augmenting the flow available at Farakka." 1I This MOU gave the Joint
Rivers Commission 18 months from the date of the MOU for completing
a pre-feasibility study and deciding upon the optimum solution. At the end
of this period, it was specified that the two governments would immediately implement the augmentation proposal agreed upon by the Joint
Rivers Commission.1' However, again, no agreement on the augmentation
scheme was completed.
In addition to reiterating the schedule for sharing the waters of the
Ganges River during the dry season, as agreed upon under the 1982 MOU,
the 1985 MOU established a Joint Committee of Experts from both
countries and entrusted it with carrying out a joint study on the available
water resources common to both countries, including schemes for
increasing the flow of the Ganges River.1'
The 1985 MOU expired on May 31,1988. The joint study was not
carried out because the representatives of the two governments in the Joint
Committee of Experts could not agree on a common proposal. Regarding
the scheme for augmenting the flow of the Ganges River at Farakka, each
country had a different proposal. India's proposal consisted of a plan to
construct a link canal to connect the Brahmaputra River with the Ganges
River at a point above the Farakka Barrage. The link canal, according to the
plan proposed by India, would help increase the flow of the Ganges River
during the dry season by diverting water to the Ganges River from the
Brahmaputra River.
Bangladesh, who feared the environmental, social, political, and
economic consequences of the proposal, rejected India's solution. Bangladesh was also concerned that the link canal might further exacerbate the
flood situation in the country during the monsoon season. Instead,
Bangladesh proposed building storage reservoirs at the upper reaches of
the Ganges in both India and Nepal to store water during the monsoon
season for release during the dry season.

143. See 1982 MOU, supra note 54, at 1. The MOU criticized the 1977 Agreement, and
stated in the preamble that the two leaders -agreed that it had not proved suitable for finding
a satisfactory and durable solution, and that with its termination fresh efforts were necessary
to arrive at such a solution." Id.
144.
145.

See id. at 2.
See 1982 MOU, supra note 54,l13.
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India, however, rejected this proposal because it wanted to reserve
the upstream waters of the Ganges River for its future needs. Moreover,
India preferred a bilateral approach and did not want to regionalize the
issue by involving another riparian, in this case Nepal.1" It is important to
note that India's proposal centered on using the Brahmaputra River to
solve the problems of the Ganges, whereas Bangladesh's proposal aimed
at using the Ganges River itself to solve the erratic water flows of the
Ganges River. "Bangladesh argued that water is best transferred over time;
India that it is best transferred over space." 7 It is also noteworthy that each
proposal involved the use of the territory of the other country. Part of the
link canal proposed by India would be constructed in Bangladesh, and part
of the storage reservoirs proposed by Bangladesh would be built in India.
The augmentation proposals introduced by India and Bangladesh
represented the position each country had adopted from the beginning of
the search for a solution. The 1977 Agreement stated that
The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission established
by the two governments in 1972 shall carry out investigations
and study of schemes relating to the augmentation of the dry
season flows, proposed or to be proposed by either Government with a view to finding a solution which is economical
and feasible. It shall submit its recommendations to the two
governments within a period of three years."
The Side Letters annexed to the 1977 Agreement included an
understanding by Bangladesh, and confirmed by India, that the words
"proposed or to be proposed by either Government" under Article IXof the
1977 Agreement "relate to any schemes which may have been proposed by
Bangladesh or India and do not exclude any scheme or schemes for
building storages in the upper reaches of the Ganges in Nepal." 49 Both Side

146. For a discussion of the proposal of each country for augmentation of the dry season
flow, see CROW ST AL., supra note 10; ABBAS, supm note 39; LYNDON JOHNSON SCHOOL OF

PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT No. 101,
WATER RESOURCES COOPERATION IN THE GANGES - BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER BASIN (1993).
147. CROW ETAL, supra note 10, at 163.

148. 1977 Agreement, supra note 52, art. IX, 17 I.L.M. at 104-05.
149. Side Letter to the Agreement: 1, Nov. 5, 1977, and confirmed by Side Letter to the
Agreement:. 2, Nov. 5,1997, in B.M. AUBAS A.T., THE GANGES WATER DIsPUrE 100-01 (2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter Side Letters]. The reference to Nepal in the Side Letter is unusual because,
as a matter of international law, the contracting parties do not have the right to obligate a
third party without its consent. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31,
art. 34,8 LLM. at 693. reads, "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
State without its consent." The Convention also states that, "An obligation arises for a third

State from a provision of a treaty if the parties intend the provision to be the means of
establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing."
Id. art. 35,8 I.L.M. at 693.
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Letters clarified further that all the proposals designed to find a solution to
the long-term problem should be treated on an equal footing and accorded
equal priority."0
Although India and Bangladesh have dearly and consistently
agreed since 1977 on the need for augmentation of the dry season flow of
the Ganges, they could not agree on how such augmentation can be
achieved. As such, the issue of augmentation of the flows of the Ganges
during the dry season remains unresolved, and the expansion of the scope
of the joint study, and the change from the Joint Rivers Commission to the
Joint Committee of Experts as the entity entrusted with the study, did not
make any difference.' 1
Moreover, although the treaty recognizes the need for cooperation
by the two governments "in finding a solution to the long-term problem of
augmenting the flows of the Ganga/Ganges during the dry season,"" it
has not laid down any terms of reference or time frame for a joint study,
nor has it created or entrusted any committee with the responsibility of
carrying out this study.
4. The Ganges Barrage
One outstanding issue between India and Bangladesh related to the
Ganges River concerns the Ganges Barrage. Since 1963, Bangladesh (then
East Pakistan) has sought to build a barrage on the Ganges River to store
the wet season flow of the Ganges for use during the dry season. India had,
in the past, opposed its construction and had seen it as a retaliatory
measure against the Farakka Barrage. Along these lines, India claimed that
large areas of Indian territory would be submerged as a result of backwater
effect. Following the conclusion of the Treaty and further discussion on the
barrage, especially its location,"'5 India has agreed to the construction of the
barrage by Bangladesh. Bangladesh now plans to build this barrage at
Pangsha, 90 miles west of Dhaka,' and presents the barrage as the best
way for guaranteeing the success of the Treaty because the barrage would
enable Bangladesh to utilize its stipulated share of water."5

150. See Side Letters, supranote 149.
151. SEE CROW Er AL, supra note 10, at 161-84.
152. See Ganges Treaty, supranote 3, Preamble & art. VIII, 36 I.L.M.at 523,525.
153. Bangladesh had initially sought to build the Ganges Barrage at the location of the
Hardinge Bridge, close to the Indian border. However, the current proposed location is at
Pangsha, about 40 miles downstream from the Hardinge Bridge, and further downstream
from the Indian border.
154. See Bangladesh Asks ADB to Finance Huge Ganges Dam, REUTERS, Aug. 24,1997.
155. See DIRECTORATE OF PLANNING (GENERAL), GOVERNMErT OF THE PEOPE's REPuBuc
OF BANGLADESH, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT PROFORMA (TAPP) FOR THE FEASIBILTY
STUDY AND DETAILED ENGINEE;R ING DESIGN OF THE GANGES BARAGE PROJECr, May 1997,

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

According to the feasibility study carried out in 1997, in the context
of this new plan, the Barrage would allow Bangladesh to make optimum
use of the water that would be available under the Ganges Water Treaty
and would permit the irrigation of most of the areas in the southwest, the
south central, and the north western regions in Bangladesh. Similarly, the
Study also suggests that water supplies through the Gorai River, which
will be fed by waters from the barrage, will reduce saline intrusion around
Khulna, thus helping to solve the existing socio-economic and environmental impacts of the areas. Moreover, the study suggests that the flows in all
tributaries and other rivers in the southwest region will be augmented so
that the natural environment, like fisheries, ground water, forestry, human
health, and navigation can be restored through the supply of upland water
flow and a reduction in salinity."5 '
Additionally, the barrage is expected "to irrigate an area of about
1.35 million hectare of land, and to protect another 1.44 million from
floods."157 Bangladesh also hopes that the barrage will assist in reducing
salinity caused by intrusion of the waters from the Bay of Bengal.
Bangladesh has officially sought financial assistance for building the
barrage from a number of bilateral and multilateral donors. The Joint
Communiqud of the Joint Rivers Commission in its thirty-second meeting
stated that
The Commission welcomed the proposal of Bangladesh to
implement the Ganges Barrage project. India indicated its
intention to consider providing technical assistance through
Water and Power Consultancy Limited (WAPCOS), a
Government of India Undertaking, which has the requisite
expertise in this regard."s
It is too early to ascertain whether construction of the Ganges
Barrage will help alleviate the water problems in the Ganges Basin in
Bangladesh during the dry season, or whether the barrage will have any
bearing on the proposals for augmenting the dry season flow of the Ganges
River.' It is also too early to speculate whether Bangladesh will be able to
raise the necessary funds to construct the barrage.
Recast, June 1997, at 6 [hereinafter TAPP].
156. See id. at 6-7.
157. See REurIms, supra note 154, quoting the Minister of Water Resources of Bangladesh,
following a meeting with the President of the Asian Development Bank in Dhaka. The figure
of "1.35 million hectare" is close to the figure of "1.31 million hectare" specified in TAPP,
supra note 155, at 7.
158. Joint Communiqud, supranote 140.
159. It is interesting to note that TAPP included as one objective of the Barrage
"augmentation of the flows of all distributories and other rivers in the South-West region....
TAPP, supra note 155, at 6-7.
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C. Bilateral Agencies under the Mahakali and the Ganges Waters
Treaties
1. General Provisions
An interesting feature of the Mahakali Treaty is the establishment
of a joint Indo-Nepalese commission,"6 called the Mahakali River
Commission (the Commission). This Commission is guided by the
principles of equality, mutual benefit, and no harm to either of the
countries." The joint nature, both from an organizational as well as
financial standpoint, is well represented because the Commission will be
composed of an equal number of representatives from both countries,162
and its expenses also are to be borne equally by both India and NepaL"
The Mahakali River Commission has been given a relatively broad
mandate. It has been directed, among other things, to carry out the
following:
1. to seek information on and, if necessary, inspect all structures
included in the Mahakali Treaty and make recommendations to
both India and Nepal to take necessary steps to implement its
provisions;
2. to make recommendations to both India and Nepal for the
conservation and utilization of the Mahakali River as envisioned
by and provided for in the Mahakali Treaty;
3. to provide expert evaluation of projects and make recommendations thereto;
4. to coordinate and monitor plans of action arising out of the
implementation of the Mahakali Treaty; and
5. to examine any differences arising between the two countries
concerning the treaty's interpretation and application."
Nevertheless, both India and Nepal continue to reserve their rights
to deal directly with each other on matters, notwithstanding the competence of the Mahakali River Commission." s In addition, both the parties can
form, if they wish, specific joint entities for the development, execution,
and operation of new projects including the PM? in the Mahakali River for

160.
161.

See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, art. 9, § 1, 36 IL.M. 531,540-41.
See id. The Ganges Treaty states in Article 9 that the sharing arrangements under the

treaty can be adjusted "based on the principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either
party..." Ganges Treaty, supra note 3,36 LLM. at 536.
162.

See Mahakali Treaty, supranote 2, art. 9, § 2,36 LL.M. at 540-41.

163. See id. § 4.
164. See id. § 3.
165.

See id. § 6.
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their mutual benefit~" The Commission is also directed to draft its rules of
procedure, which
shall be submitted to both India and Nepal for their
167
concurrence.

Under the Ganges Treaty, just as was the case under the previous
agreements, a committee consisting of equal numbers of representatives
nominated by the two governments, called the Joint Committee, was
established. It is authorized to set up suitable teams at both Farakka in
West Bengal and Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh, to observe and record at
Farakka the daily flows below Farakka Barrage, in the feeder canal and the
Hardinge Bridge. The Committee is also authorized to develop its own
procedures and method of functioning, and is required to submit all the
data it collects, as well as an annual report to both countries. The Treaty
requires the two governments to meet at appropriate levels, following
submission of these reports, to decide upon any further action that may be
required.
The main responsibility of the Committee is to examine "any
difficulty arising out of the implementation of those arrangements, and of
the operation of the Farakka Barrage."" s As such, the mandate of the
Committee under the Ganges Treaty is limited in comparison to the
mandate of the Commission under the Mahakali Treaty.
2. Dispute Resolution under the Mahakaliand the Ganges Treaties
The dispute resolution mechanism envisaged by the Mahakali
Treaty is relatively elaborate and advanced. If the Mahakali River
Commission should fail to come up with a recommendation after
examining any disparities between the countries within three months, or
if either party disagrees with the Commission's recommendation, a dispute
shall be deemed to have arisen and shall then be submitted for arbitration.
In so doing, either country is required to give three months prior notice to
the other country.16
A tribunal composed of three arbitrators conducts all arbitrations.
One arbitrator must be nominated by Nepal, one by India, and neither
country is allowed to nominate its own national representative. The third
arbitrator is to be appointed jointly by the two arbitrators, and shall preside
over the tribunal. In the event that the two countries are unable to agree
upon the third arbitrator within ninety days after receipt of a proposal,
either country may request the Secretary General of the Permanent Court

166.
167.
168.
169.

See id. art. 10, 36 I.L.M. at 541.
Seeid. art. 9,§5.
See Ganges Treaty, supra note 3, art. VII, 36 I.L.M. at 524.
See Mahakali Treaty, supranote 2, art. 11, § 1, 36 LL.M. 531,541-42.
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of Arbitration at the Hague to appoint an arbitrator. The arbitrator so
chosen, however, cannot be a national of either country.'"e
Regarding the modus operandi of arbitration, the Mahakali Treaty
states that it shall be determined by the arbitration tribunal and that the
decision of a majority of the arbitrators shall be considered to be the
decision of the tribunal. The proceedings of the tribunal shall be conducted
in English and the decision of the tribunal shall be in writing. Both
countries are obligated to accept the decision as final, definitive, and
binding.1 7 The Mahakali Treaty, however, is silent regarding the venue of
arbitration, the administrative support of the arbitration tribunal, and the
remuneration and expenses of its arbitrators. The Treaty simply states that
these aspects would be dealt with by an exchange of notes between the
parties. Moreover, through an exchange of notes, the parties can also agree
on alternative procedures for settling differences arising under the
Mahakali Treaty.1 r
Under the Ganges Treaty, the Joint Committee is entrusted with
"examining any difficulty arising out of the implementation of [the above]
arrangements and of the operation of the Farakka Barrage."" If the
Committee fails to resolve any difference or dispute, then such difference
or dispute would be referred to the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission for resolution. If the Joint Rivers Commission fails to resolve such a
difference or dispute, then the Treaty directs that the matter "be referred to
the two Governments which shall meet urgently at the appropriate level to
resolve it by mutual discussion.""' 4 As such, the Treaty establishes political
means, not arbitration, as the method for resolving any difference or
dispute arising out of the implementation of the Treaty.1 Actual water
sharing for the Ganges River during the first year of the Treaty indicated
that the absence of arbitration has dearly hindered resolution of the dispute
that arose during that year.
Interestingly, as inferred above, when the Ganges flow was below
the thresholds specified in the Ganges Treaty, each of the countries,
Bangladesh and India, insisted on an interpretation of its relevant
provisions in ways that suited them most. This obviously led to nonresolution and increased tension between the countries. An arbitration
panel, in this kind of situation, it is submitted, would have been a better

170. See id. § 2.
171. See id. art. 11, § 3,36 LL.M. at 542.
172. See id. art. 11, § 4.
173. See supra note 3, at 525.
174. See Ganges Treaty, supra note 3, art. VII, 36 LL.M. at 525.
175. Similarly, none of the previous agreements specified arbitration as a method of
dispute settlement over the Ganges. This is incontrast also to the Indus Waters Treaty, supra
note 42, which included detailed provisions on arbitration.
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tool to diffuse the tension by providing more objective interpretation. In
this regard, no doubt, the comprehensive provisions on arbitration in the
Mahakali Treaty makes it a more effective legal instrument than the Ganges
Treaty.
D. Ratification and Termination of the Mahakali and the Ganges
Treaties
The Mahakali Treaty went into effect on June 5, 1997, the date of
exchange of instruments of ratification by both the parties, pursuant to
Article 12 of the Treaty. 176 The Treaty is to remain valid for a period of
seventy-five years." The provisions of this treaty must be reviewed by
both countries at ten-year intervals or earlier if requested by either country
and amendments thereto will be made, if necessary.' In order to give
effect to its provisions, the two countries, as required, shall enter into
additional agreements.'
The Ganges Treaty became valid upon signature, and did not
require ratification by either party."W The Treaty is to remain in force for

176. See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, art. 12,36 I.ML. 531,543. The Nepalese Parliament
ratified the Mahakali Treaty with a two-thirds majority. See DPR to be Done within Six Months,
RISING NEPAL NATIONAL DAILY, June 6,1997, at 1, 8 (Kathmandu); India Nepal Sign 5 Pacts,
Ratify Mahakali Treaty, HINDUSTAN TIMDEs, June 5,1997. Prior to ratification, the Joint Session
of the Nepalese Parliament had raised certain issues and recommended that such issues be
addressed during the preparation of the Detailed Project Report (DPR). The Prime Minister

of India, while exchanging the instruments of ratification, agreed that the issues would receive
attention. See Nepal IndiaJoint Statement, PEoPLE's REviEw, June 19, 1997, at

14 (visited June

19,1997) <http://www.info-nepal.com/p-review/june97/une-19/nepal.html>; Time Frame
Fixed To Resolve BilateralIssues: Chand,GujralHold Talks, RISING NEPAL NATIONAL DAILY, June
6,1997, at 8.
177. See Mahakali Treaty, supra note 2, art. 12, § 2,36 1L.M. at 543.
178. See id. § 3.
179. See id. § 4.
180. See Ganges Treaty, supra note 3, art. XII, 36 I.LM. at 526, which states: "This Treaty
shall enter into force upon signature...", thus indicating that the treaty does not require
ratification by either of the two countries. The Constitution of India, as a general rule, does
not require ratification of treaties by parliament The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of
India divides responsibilities over matters into three lists: the Union List, the State List and
the Concurrent List. See INDIA CONST. 7th schedule, list . The Union List includes, as per
Entry 14, "entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of
treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries." Id. at § 14. On the other hand,
the Constitution of Bangladesh states in Article 145A that "All treaties with foreign countries
shall be submitted to the President, who shall cause them to be laid before Parliament," which
again does not specify the need for ratification of treaties. BANGLADESH CoNsT. art. 145A. It
is, however, noteworthy that Bangladesh, like India, is currently governed by a parliamentary
system under which the executive is elected by, and answerable to parliament. At the time of
the conclusion of the treaty, the United Front government in India, with the backing of the
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thirty years; almost three times the length of time for the entire previous
agreements on the Ganges between India and Bangladesh. The Treaty is
renewable on the basis of mutual consent. It shall be reviewed by the two
governments at five-year intervals or earlier as required by either party.
Either country, however, can request that the first review take place after
to assess the impact and success of the sharing
two years in 18order
1
arrangements.
V. CONCLUSION
In spite of some unclear provisions and incomplete arrangements,
the Mahakali Treaty, no doubt from a legal standpoint, has provided a
mechanism for a reinforced collaboration between India and Nepal on the
Mahakali River. Undeniably, there are problems on both sides of the
border. However, if both countries cooperate diligently to carry out the
provisions of the Treaty, many economic, political, and social advantages
will materialize. In order to reap these benefits, however, each country may
need to temper its nationalist ego, which has remained a predominant
feature in the water resource relations between the two countries.
With regard to the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project, the flagship
project under the Mahakali Integrated Development scheme, there is
currently a great deal of concern over the growing wave of public
indifference towards it. This is especially troublesome since differences
over the interpretation of certain provisions of the Mahakali Treaty relating
to how the waters of the Mahakali River should be shared have erupted
between Nepal and India. Notwithstanding these differences, the Mahakali
Treaty, as noted by some, "remains a milestone because it is more than a
project." "l The Treaty "has informed the world of a conducive environment in the region for development of water resources. Projects as big as
Pancheshwar take time to materialize. " 183 "What is necessary for the

Congress Party, had a majority in the Indian Parliament, while the Awami League also had
a comfortable majority in the Bangladeshi Parliament. It should be added, however, that all
treaties that result in financial obligations are presented to the Indian Parliament for
ratification. This explains why the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan (1960),
and the Mahakali Treaty, both of which obliged India to make certain financial contributions
towards implementation of works related to the respective treaty, required ratification by the
Indian Parliament. Under the constitution of Nepal, all treaties require ratification, regardless
of whether the treaty results in financial obligations or not.
181. See Ganges Treaty, supranote 3, art. X, 36 I.L.M. at 526.
182. Statement of Krishna V. Rajan, Indian Ambassador. See Sub-Regional Water Conference
Begins, KAThMANDU POST, Feb. 10,1998.
183. Id.
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success of the PMP and other projects of equal magnitude is durable
consensus and consistency in the working of the parties.""
The first two parts of the Treaty, dealing with Sarada and
Tanakpur, only codify in one text the improved version of the existing
regime. The part of the treaty dealing with the FMP from a theoretical
standpoint, on the other hand, definitely asserts some positive attributes.
For instance, the following principles established by the treaty are
extremely valuable: utilizing the water of the Mahakali River so that each
country enjoys equal entitlement to the water (Article 3); designing the
project so that the total net benefit to each country is maximized (Article
3.1); basing the price of the energy produced on a cost avoided principle
(paragraph 3[a] of the letter); requiring each country to invest in the project
in proportion to the benefits they each receive (Article 3.3); and accounting
for incremental and additional irrigation benefits and flood control benefits
(paragraph 3[a] of the letter).
However, a great deal remains to be done. The progress made in
establishing the DPR has been relatively slow.' Still, the very fact that the
Mahakali Treaty has done so much advertisement for hydro-development
is something we all must take note of.' The mode of financing megaprojects in the days to come will be very different from the practices in
vogue until now. The vast quantum of capital required for these projects
and the fact that such funds are only available in the private sector of most
developed countries implies that these big projects will have to be
developed through foreign direct investments.
So far, talks between Nepal and India on the DPR have not been
conclusive, and the DPR has not been completed within the six months
mandated by the treaty. The technical teams working on the DPR asked for
two more years.187 This did not come as a surprise to many. Most concerns
raised earlier by the two sides have resurfaced, including the conditions
attached to the ratification by the Nepalese Parliament.'" For example, the
provision in the Mahakali Treaty regarding the equal sharing of water is
applicable only to that water which is not already in use by India. This was
established by the "prior use" clause in the Mahakali Treaty. India has
recently requested, under the "prior use" clause, not only water from. the
Sarada Barrage but also water from the lower Sarada Canal.'8 This would

184. Id.
185. The technical teams from both governments have requested an extension. See supra
text accompanying note 99.
186. Statement of the Nepalese Minister of Water Resources. See Sub-Regional Water
Conference Begins, supra note 182.
187. See Two Years Extension Sought to PreparePancheshnrDPR, supranote 99.
188. See id.; text accompanying note 99.
189. See Not Surprising,KATHMANDU POST, Nov. 12,1997.
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mean that India would have to be assured 449 cusecs of water. It is only
after India receives its quota of "prior use" of Mahakali waters that the
remaining flow could be divided equally between the two countries.
The technical-level talks, however, have not been entirely
unfruitful. India has agreed to construct a larger 6,000-plus megawatt
power station at Pancheshwar. The final DPR, however, is yet to be
prepared. Moreover, because of the political strictures of the Nepalese
Parliament, the technicians by themselves will hardly be in a position to
resolve all the issues involved.1' Hence, political-level talks between
leaders of the two countries are of prime importance if the DPR talks are to
bear any fruit. Already, skeptics are predicting that nothing will come of
the Mahakali Treaty for the next two decades or so. 91
In spite of its shortcomings, the Mahakali Treaty has made
attempts to reconcile the conflicting interests between the two countries as
much as possible. When compared with the previous agreements relating
to the Mahakali River, that is the Sarada Treaty and the Tanakpur
Agreement, the Mahakali Treaty has made significantly noticeable progress
both in terms of broadening the scope of water resource development as
well as defining the rights and obligations of the two countries. The
possibilities for improvement exist. The Mahakali Treaty envisions
extensive bilateral cooperation. Regular reviews by designated governmental entities may take place. The Joint Commission will also provide a
continuing point of contact and an appropriate exchange of information
that will help the two governments in their decision making. If the
finalization of the DPR does not materialize, then the Mahakali Treaty
would still continue to exist, but would be reduced in scope and would be
limited to the governance of the Sarada and Tanakpur barrages.
Regarding the Ganges Treaty, our conclusion is equally positive.
In spite of the considerable low flow of the Ganges recorded during the
critical period of the dry season of 1997, the signing of the Ganges Treaty
in 1999 can still be considered a major breakthrough. India and Bangladesh
have succeeded in concluding a long-term treaty on the sharing of the
waters of the Ganges during the dry season. This treaty also fills the
vacuum that has prevailed since the expiration of the 1985 MOU on May
31,1988. The dynamics of the flow of the Ganges during the dry season of
1997 confirmed that an agreement on the augmentation of the Ganges,
rather than the sharing arrangements, is the central theme to any attempt
towards a sustainable resolution of the conflict. However, the most
important outcome of the treaty is that it has created a conducive atmosphere for discussing a number of water-related issues between the two

190. See id.
191. See id.
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countries and for reaching agreement on a number of these issues. This
includes the issue of developing a method to augment the dry season flow
of the Ganges River. The resolution of the long-standing issue of the
Ganges Barrage should also be attributed to the success of concluding the
Ganges Treaty, and to the conducive atmosphere emanating therefrom.
It may be argued, however, that the Treaty centers on the issue of
sharing water from the Ganges River during the dry season, without laying
the foundation for resolving the larger and more critical problem of
augmentation of its flow during the dry season. This contention is certainly
true. Aside from recognizing the need for cooperation for finding a solution
to the long-term problem of increasing the flow of the Ganges River during
the dry season, no other details on how to handle this issue are spelled out
in the Treaty. However, it should be remembered that the detailed provisions set out in the references and schedules for the augmentation study
in the 1977 Agreement, and in each of the 1982 and 1985 MOUs, have not
yielded any results as far as the augmentation study is concerned. As such,
the issue is not how many details are spelled out in the treaty, but rather,
whether the momentum created by the conclusion of the treaty can result
in an agreement on augmentation schemes. Such a momentum, along with
the revival of the Joint Rivers Commission and the agreement of India to
the construction of the Ganges Barrage, seems more likely to lead to an
agreement by both countries on a proposal for augmentation of the flow of
the Ganges during the dry season, and implementation of such a proposal.
The Ganges Treaty also makes oblique references to some of the
other related issues, such as flood management during the monsoon season
(when water sharing is not an issue), irrigation, river basin development,
and the generation of hydroelectric power for the mutual benefit of the
peoples of the two countries.' 2 Although no details on any of those areas
have been spelled out in the Treaty, the momentum created by the Treaty,
and the fact that those issues have been brought to the forefront, could
signal the start of serious deliberations on those issues. This could also
result in an overall Ganges Basin development plan. The positive atmosphere created by the treaty could also assist in resolving the other
outstanding issues such as the transit facility through Bangladesh of Indian
goods going to, or coming from its northeastern states,1' and the free trade
between the two countries.

192. See Ganges Treaty, supra note 3, Preamble, 36 LLM. at 523.
193. Except for a small stretch of land about 20 to 30 miles wide falling between Nepal and
Bangladesh and forming part of India, the northeastern states are separated from the rest of
India by Bangladesh. For discussions on the transit facility, see John Cherian, A Historic
Accord: Sharing Ganga Water uith Bangladesh, FRONTNS, Jan. 10,1997, at 47 (India); Jyoti
Malhotra, Transit Facilitiesfor Goods Likely, BUSINES STANDARD, Dec. 13, 1996 (India).
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In conclusion, the signing of the Mahakali and the Ganges treaties
has indeed provided the signatory countries with an opportunity for
meaningful cooperation for the benefit of the millions of people in the three
countries whose livelihood depend on the waters of these two rivers.

